































Access to Water Supply and Sanitation 
in Brazil: Historical and Current 












   
Access to water supply and sanitation in Brazil:  
 Historical and current reflections; future perspectives 
                                                   Léo Heller 
 
Abstract 
The paper provides an analytical description of water supply and sanitation in 
Brazil. While acknowledging the fragility and imprecision of available quantitative 
indicators,  particularly  in  measuring  service  coverage,  it  attempts  to  identify 
trends. A description of the sector’s evolution is included which seeks to  identify 
milestones along the way that present obstacles and opportunities for the current 
day. Experiments are described—municipal cooperatives and experiments, state 
company  experiments  and  the  condominial  system—that  may  be  considered 
successful  and  supply  paradigms  for  a  new  scenario.  Finally,  there  is  a  look 
ahead  to  possible  scenarios  for  the  future,  based  on  the  current  legal  and 
politico-institutional landscape. In this connection the paper highlights the federal 
government’s bill for Law no. 5.296 and the potential it has to supply what the 
sector historically has lacked—the setting of clear guidelines for service provision 
that would lead to universality and improvements in the quality of service for the 
population.  The document tries to show that, although important advances in 
water supply and sanitation have been made in Brazil, there remains a significant 
deficit to be addressed. Namely, that a more satisfactory framework, including 
progress  in  meeting  the  Millenium  Development  Goals,  will  be  produced  only 
when  the  sector’s  public  policy  dimensions,  and  its  need  for  effective 
administrative  tools,  are  seriously  taken  into  consideration.  Furthermore,  it  is 
suggested that subsequent analyses of this reality and its evolution ought not to 
ignore  the  tensions  produced  in  the  struggle  within  the  sector  for  social, 
economic, and political power, which variously pits its different actors—federal  
authorities, private enterprise, and civil society— against one other.  
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It is truly no small endeavor to assess water supply and sanitation services in a 
given locality (1). The most common approach is to use coverage and service 
indices  available  from  official  sources  (2).  At  the  national  level  the  standard 
procedure has been to take the number of residents with access to services, 
usually for urban, rural, and total population, then to determine their proportion 
relative  to  the  total  respective  population.  This  process  involves  a  number  of    
imprecise  elements:  definitions  of  urban  and  rural;  how  total  populations  are 
determined;  how  the  population  served  is  determined  and,  most  of  all,  the 
concept of access. 
 
Different  definitions  of  access  can  be  adopted  for  both  water  supply  and 
sanitation systems. Each definition incorporates social and political values; each 
has  been  found  to  lead  to  different  results  and  implications.  The  difficulty, 
however,  does  not  lay  simply  in  defining  the  status  of  the  service  under 
consideration. Clear methodological limitations also exist in terms of how a given 
status is characterized, particularly the quality of service delivery.  Overcoming 
these  limitations  produces  analyses  of  greater  depth—combining  quantitative 
with qualitative assessment, aggregate with disaggregated data, secondary data 
with investigations in the field, historical perspective with the current or cyclical 
context, and political-institutional analysis with evaluations of indicators, among 
other  points  of  focus.  Clearly,  an  undertaking  based  on  such  a  vision  would 
require specific studies of a kind that usually are impossible when relying solely 
on research using available secondary sources. 
 
Aware both of the limitations of an analysis that employs only official data, and of 
the difficulties involved in attempting a study in greater depth, the present article 
seeks  to  assess  the  current  state  of  access  to  water  supply  and  sanitation 
services  in  Brazil  on  the  basis  of  a  broader  range,  and  a  more  qualitative 
appreciation, of the data.   
 
It  therefore  begins  with  a  description  of  the  historical  evolution  of  the  sector, 
attempting  to  identify  milestones  along  the  way  that  present  obstacles  and 
opportunities for the current day. The state of service delivery over recent years 
is assessed in an effort to establish indices of quality where these are apparent, 
while  pointing  out  the  limitations  of  available  indicators.  Experiments  in  the 
country  that  may  be  considered  successful,  supplying  paradigms  for  a  new 
scenario,  are  described.  Finally,  the  study  will  attempt  to  look  ahead  to 
prospective scenarios in the context of the current legal and political/institutional 
landscape. We are aware that this will be a preliminary effort, one that will require 
adjustments and greater analytic depth, but which ultimately will serve as a frame 
of reference for later assessments. 
   
2. Brief History of the Organization of the Services 
 
In order to more properly understand the current state of this sector in Brazil it is 
essential  to  examine  how  the  Brazilian  national  government’s  view  of  it  has 
evolved throughout history. Five distinct periods in the sequence of models for 
sanitation in Brazil are identified here, as follows (3): 
 
First Period: Sixteenth to mid-Nineteenth Centuries 
    
A Portuguese colony until the start of the nineteenth century, Brazil supplied a 
platform for an economic policy based on foreign trade. The colonial structure 
was shaped to serve those interests; there were therefore no explicit policies 
aimed at improving living conditions in Brazi. Political authority was characterized 
by  decentralization,  beginning  with  the  system  of  hereditary  captaincies  that 
concentrated  political  power  in  the  hands  of  the  largest  landholders.  Most 
sanitation measures were of an individual nature, and few collective steps were 
taken  until  the  mid-eighteenth  century.  After  gold  was  discovered  population 
growth generated a demand  for collective, public sanitation measures, which 
would  favor  the  most  vigourous  economic  centers.  The  situation  changed 
somewhat  when  the  Portuguese  Court  was  transferred  to  Brazil,  generating 
demand for hygenic improvements in the ports. This resulted in the creation of 
the first institutions of public health and hygiene, but most initiatives were limited 
to the capital, Rio de Janeiro. The role of federal authorities during the period 
was  heavily  determined  by  the  fact  that  most  initiatives  were  targeted  at 





Second Period: 1850-1910 
 
With the rapid growth of the cities came a growing understanding on the part of 
the governing elites of the social implications of sanitation and of the consequent 
risks of epidemics. Yellow fever, cholera, and smallpox were common throughout 
the territory, reaching drastic proportions in the most populous cities. Based on 
slave labor, the national economy suffered from the instability epidemics caused. 
It was an understanding of this interdependence, along with a desire to improve 
Brazil’s image in Europe, that led to the introduction of sanitation initiatives. After 
the  proclamation  of  the  Republic  in  1889  a  new  constitution  reaffirming  the 
states’  autonomous  authority  to  provide  health  services  brought  about 
decentralization,  except  in  the  capital,  where  they  remained  the  federal 
government’s responsibility. Nevertheless, this constitutional arrangement limited 
the  national  government’s  reach  over  national  territory,  stalling  any  further 
advances in  coordinating sanitation initiatives and consolidating public authority 
in Brazil. The contagionist concept, based on the paradigm of the uni-causality of 
disease, came to prevail in scientific circles and the focus was on combating 
etiologic agents, not on initiatives of a  more collective nature. During the end of 
the  19th  century  and  the  beginnings  of  the  20th,  however,  the  national 
government began to define water supply and sanitation services as belonging 
under public authority, and to transfer them to private enterprise, mainly firms 
backed by English capital. The effort to link up the Brazilian economy with global 
capitalism crucially affected sanitation policies, which now focused on creating  
suitable  infrastructural  conditions  for  economic  activities.  Private  companies 
therefore  gave  priority  to  locations  where    national  elites  were  concentrated,    
preferring to intervene in the central regions of  cities where residents were in a 
position to ensure healthy returns on their investment. 
 
Third Period: 1910-1950 
 
The  emancipation  of  the  slaves  at  the  end  of  the  19th  century  had  deep 
repurcussions: slaves were abandoned by the national government and replaced 
by  immigrants,  who  received  similar  treatment.  This  meant  expanding  the 
number  of  excluded  peoples,  and  prompted  the  irregular  settlement  of  urban 
spaces.  The  general  public  was  excluded  from  any  of  the  benefits  of  the 
country’s modernization. This generated unrest in the population, including public 
protests against companies and the limited systems they were introducing. The 
majority of companies were of short duration, as a result, except for the Rio de 
Janeiro sewerage company, which was in business until 1947, and the Santos, 
Sao Paulo water and sewerage company, which lasted until 1953. In the wake of 
this  discontent  the  national  government  took  charge  of  administering  the 
services, creating specific entities for municipal, state, or federal administraiton. 
At the same time, in the beginning years of the twentieth century, the so-called 
“re-discovery  of  the  interior”,  with  it’s  rural  expeditions,  called  attention  to  the 
precarious  health  conditions  affecting  the  population  there.  This  awareness 
resulted in the movement known as the Brazilian Pro-Sanitation League, which 
sought  improvements  in  rural  health  as  key  to  future  economic  development 
based on the country’s agricultural potential. This movement became the vehicle 
for  the  national  government’s  expanded  presence  in  units  of  the  federation, 
impelled  by  the  understanding  that  isolated  economic  and  technical  solutions 
would  not  solve  the  problem.  There  was  a  consequent  incentive  to  develop 
trained  personnel  in  the  field  of  sanitation  engineering.  This,  along  with 
advancing  industrialization,  hastened  the  national  government’s  takeover  of 
sanitation initiatives. The period 1910-1930 was the first great leap in the history 
of sanitation in Brazil, and would come to be known as the Era of Sanitation, 
lasting until the 1950’s. From then on there would be a progressive bifurcation of 
water and sanitation.  
 
Fourth period: 1950-1969 
 
This period was marked by innumerable discussions and debates surrounding 
the institutionalization of the WSS sector, which now had greater significance in 
the context of industrial policy. Different administrative models were analyzed, 
and financing solutions began to draw more attention as well. Still, society and 
the municipalities themselves remained at the margins of decision-making. The    
first post-graduate programs in sanitation engineering were created at the start of 
this period with the support of the USA, which maintained heavy influence over 
the technological foundations then being created.  In 1953 the Ministry of Health 
was established. For its own part, the WSS sector came to be more and more 
independent  of  the  health  sector  in  its  characteristics,  adopting  new 
administrative  models  as  alternatives  to  direct  municipal  managment.  Greater 
autonomy was sought for the services, and the 1950’s and ‘60’s saw a transition 
from    a  centralized  administrative  model  to  service  providers  of  a  more 
autonomous nature. The period was marked by important decisions that sought 
to foster progress in WSS initiatives; the concept of self-sustaining tariffs was 
adopted, which helped to generate additional financial resources. This took place 
in  the  context  which  the  country’s  new  reality  was  imposing,  that  of  growing 
industrialization and urbanization. From then on the politico-institutional context 
of  the  sector  would  adapt,  making  it  possible  to  implement  PLANASA  [the 
National Sanitation Plan] over the following decade through the progressive use 
of financial support mechanisms and technical assistance—with the still-heavy 
presence of American technical cooperation.  
 
Fifth Period: The 1970’s to the present 
 
The  Brazilian  context  at  the  start  of  the  1970’s  was  that  of  an  authoritarian 
government which, politically, imposed harsh restrictions on individual liberties 
and censored free expression in the media. In the economic sphere there was 
accelerated growth thanks to a massive intake of foreign capital, which resulted 
in  runaway  increases  in  foreign  debt.  During  the  military  dictatorship  national 
urban  policy  came  to  be  one  facet  of  a  larger  strategy  to  achieve  economic 
growth  and  bolster  the  new  regime.  Investment  in  water  systems  and  water 
supply  came  to  be  part  of  the  effort  to  generate  new  jobs,  propel  economic 
development,  and  win  public  approval,  thereby  softening  rejection  of  the  new 
political order. PLANASA [The National Sanitation Plan] was therefore launched 
at the beginning of this period, in the midst of the “economic miracle”. Its funding 
was based on the FGTS-Employment Guarantee Fund [Fundo de Garantia por 
Tempo  de  Serviço],  gathered  from  company  witholdings  of  employee  wages. 
This context is described below in a discussion of the current scene, in light of its 
profound influence on the sector’s present state. 
 
It is clear that, as an area of public policy, the Brazilian national government’s 
view of water supply and sanitation, and the extent of its responsibility for them, 
has gradually changed. The view usually was the product of factors external to 
the workings of the sector itself, for example: concerns associated with disease 
control,  including  the  necessity  of  good  sanitation  conditions;  or  economic,    
political, social, and cultural processes that influenced development models for 
the  country  during  each  era.  In  each  era,  as  well,  perceptions  of  the  sector 
clearly were determined by then-prevailing concepts of the state. Moreover, the 
nature of the sector itself came to influence the dynamic of other sectors and 
other aspects of the population’s quality of life, for example its impact on health, 
the environment, and on social and economic conditions. 
 
History further shows that, if delivering suitable sanitation services to the public 
initially was a task for which no one entity cared to assume responsibility, in light 
of  the  burden  it  imposed,  the  service  gradually  came  to  be  coveted  as  an 
important  lever  of  political,  economic  and  social  power,  prompting  disputes 
between public and private actors and between different federal authorities. The 
description of the historical and polito-institutional framework presented in this 
text helps to illustrate this. It should be added that, paradoxically, the struggle 
over this power occurs even in contexts where the dearth of services, and the 
challenge of providing them, are most profound. 
 
The field of water supply and sanitation reached its present form when it was 
reorganized during the 1970’s as part of PLANASA’s implementation, and a new 
structural regime was established for the sector. This plan, the concept of which 
still  exerts  broad  influence  in  the  country,  set  in motion  important  institutional 
changes as it was implemented. 
 
Perhaps PLANASA’s most important legacy has been in its changing the federal 
entity responsible for administering the services. The Brazilian federal structure, 
in which significant power is concentrated in the hands of the states, was highly 
conducive to transferring administration of the services from the local to the state 
level.  If, up to that time, the union and the states had acted principally in the 
areas of technical assistance and the financing of projects for water supply and 
sanitation, under this plan the states would now become the direct providers of 
services.  Although  the  municipalities  owned  the  services  under  the  federal 
constitution then in effect, they now found themselves having to authorize the 
transfer of services to the state level, or risk losing access to federal and state 
funding.  A  contractual  relationship  was  therefore  established  similar  to  that 
currently  used  in many  parts  of  the  world  for  formalizing  private  participation: 
concessions. This resulted in the creation of a new company for water supply 
and  sanitation  in  every  state  of  the  federation,  in  some  cases  by  adapting 
existing structures. These in turn became responsible for securing financing, for 
introducing  (or  expanding)  systems,  and  for  their  operation  and  maintenance, 
while gaining the right to collect the respective tariffs. 
 
Another of PLANASA’s features was that it established a new source of public 
funding  for  its  activities,  which  initially  was  more  reliable  than  the  scattered 
sources that prevailed before the plan was launched; the FGTS [Employment 
Guarantee Fund].    
 
Also  under  the  rubric  of  financial  management,  the  plan  established  that  the 
services would become self-sustaining on the basis of tariffs collected, and that, 
at the state-company level, this support could be supplemented by a policy of 
cross-subsidies, using a tariff model of each state’s own devising. 
 
Historically, PLANASA’s implementation should also be placed in the context of 
the veritable “urban revolution” experienced by the country during that period, 
with high population growth and clamorous migration from rural zones into the 
major cities. Over a period of 30 years Brazilian cities went from a population of 
52 million residents in 1970, representing 56% of the country’s population, to a 
population of 138 million residents in 2000, which then corresponded to 81% of 
the population—an impressive growth of 86 million new residents, needing and 
demanding urban infrastructure. 
 
The dissolution in 1986 of the BNH -National Housing Bank [Banco Nacional de 
Habitaçao]—PLANASA’s financing entity, and the transition to democracy, led to 
a degree of change in institutional methods and the forms of federal government 
activity,  but  the  prevailing  model  was  not  modified  to  any  great  extent.    It  is 
important to emphasize that the municipal level’s role was enhanced during that 
time, particularly after the Federal Constitution of 1986, and as a consequence of 
it. This resulted in greater political-administrative autonomy, larger budgets, and 
increased  access  to  financing--  while  falling  short  of  what  would  have  been 
desirable in decentralization under ideal circumstances. 
 
Therefore  it  cannot  be  said  that  one  sole  model,  or  linear  path  of  political-
institutional  options  came  into  being  to  replace  the model  represented  by  the 
BNH. In the two decades following the bank’s dissolution, a succession of federal 
administrations passed through phases of anarchic institutional oscillation (the 
Sarney  government  –1985-90),  over-reliance  on  private  forces  in  shaping  the 
sector’s political orientation (the Fernando Collor de Mello government—1992-
94),    a  nationalism  which  yielded  few  results  in  the  area  (Itamar  Franco 
government,  --1992–94),  systematic,  ill-fated  efforts  to  expand  private 
participation  (the  two  terms  of  Fernando  Henrique  Cardoso’s  administration  – 
1995-2002),  and  an  attempt  at  ordering  the  sector  institutionally  (Lula’s 
administration, beginning in 2003).  
 
From a legal perspective, a milestone in the effort to organize the water supply 
and sanitation sector came in 1993 when, after extensive and productive debate 
among  various  entities  representing  different  segments  of  the  sector,  the 
National  Congress  passed  PLC-19,  which  coordinated  the  National  Sanitation 
Policy and its legal mechanisms. Nevertheless, after its legislative approval PLC 
199 was vetoed in its entirety by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso on the 
grounds  that  it  was  not  in  the  public  interest.  As  an  alternative  to  PL199 the 
government introduced the Sanitation Sector Modernization Project [Projeto de    
Modernização do Setor de Saneamento (PMSS)], which would be financed by 
the World Bank [BIRD], consistent with neoliberal principles. 
 
Another legal reference worthy of note is Law 8.987, known as the Concessions 
Law and signed by President Cardoso in 1995, which regulated the system of 
concessions and allowed private enterprise to provide public services. Along with 
this  legislation  there  was  an  effort,  via  PLS  266,  to  transfer  ownership  of 
metropolitan-area services to the states; the heated debate it generated led to its 
rejection by Congress. It is believed that one of the project’s main objectives was 
to reduce risk for private enterprise in those regions, which were more attractive 
to capital investment. 
 
As  part  of  the  same  privatization  rationale,  an  agreement  with  the  IMF  was 
signed in 1999 committing the Brazilian government to accelerate and broaden 
the scope of the privatizaton and licensing program for water and wastewater 
services.  The  government  declared  it  was  adopting  measures  to  limit  the 
municipalities’  access  to  official  resources.  As  part  of  the  policy  the  same 
administration  sought  to  launch  programs  and  projects—for  the  most  part 
financed  by  BIRD—aimed  at  making  the  state  companies  more  attractive  to 
private enterprise.  
 
As a rule, during the period after PLANASA was implemented water supply and 
sanitation  had  hardly  any  formal  organization  at  all  within  the  state-level 
government  apparatus.  In  general  the  states  disavowed  their  responsibilities, 
claiming that these fell to the state companies, although the latter were limited in 
the  geographic  reach  of  their  coverage  since  a  portion  of  the  municipalities 
retained management of water supply services (In 2000, 68.8%  of districts were 
operated  by  state  companies  and  45.5  by  municipal  agencies)  and  an  even 
larger portion retained sanitation services (14.1% of the districts were operated 
by state companies and 38.4% by municipal agencies in 2000) (4). There was an 
equal failure on the part of most municipalities to shoulder their duties in the 
area, especially those that had concluded concession contracts. It was thus rare 
to find any kind of mechanism for social oversight or community involvement. 
 
 
3. Evolution and current state of access to services: information and 
disinformation from available indicators 
 
3.1  Statistics for access to services 
 
Assessing  the  evolution  of  access  to  water  supply  and  sanitation  services  in 
detail is a complex endeavor, depending on one’s objectives. Brazil maintains a 
periodically updated data system on sanitation that is considered quite complete, 
even exemplary. Still, it is often unable to put service delivered to populations in 
an  appropriate  qualitative  context,  because  the  information  systems  ultimately 
valorize the indicators’ quantitative dimensions.    
 
A  part  of  this  task  should  certainly  be  to  try  and  quantify  the  portion  of  the 
population  included  in  and  excluded  from  access  to  services,  but  also  to 
characterize the quality of that access, searching for quality indicators for how 
the population is served.  Brazil registers one of the highest [income]-inequality 
levels in the world (UNDP 2005), making it important in the national context to try 
to identify in which areas, and in what magnitude, asymmetries occur.   
 
Data from the Brazilian Foundation and Institute for Geography and Statistics 
[IBGE-Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística], which performs a 
census  every  decade  and  takes  yearly  sample  surveys,  permit  a  fairly  close 
assessment  of  how  coverage  for  community  water  supply  services  and  for 
wastewater  collection  systems  has  evolved.  Generally  speaking  the  censuses 
allow us to estimate population coverage, and the sample surveys household 
coverage.  
 
Based on these findings, Figure 1 shows how the percentage of coverage by   
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Sources: IBGE/National Study by Sampling of Households – [PNAD- Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicílios – (1992-1993,1995-1999,2001-2003), IBGE/2000 Demographic Census. 
Figure  1.  Water  supply  system  coverage.  Brazil;  total  population,  urban 
population, and rural population. 1991-2003. 
    
 In this most recent period urban population coverage rose about 4.5 percentage 
points (from 87 to 91.4%) and, even more significantly, from 9.3 to 25% for the 
rural population—an increase of more than 16.4 percentage points. 
 
Such behavior shows the difficulty of making further advances in universalizing 
urban  coverage;  the  population  still  not  provided  with  service  is  found 
predominantly  in  peripheral  and  informally  urbanized  areas.  This  makes  it 
necessary  to  adopt  specific  programs  that  are  integrated  within  urban 
development  programs.  Still,  for  all  that  service  to  the  rural  population  has 
advanced, coverage is still only in its beginnings. Indeed, the same data reveals 
the existence of 12,000,000 Brazilians in cities and 22,000,000 in rural areas still 
unserved, in addition to the demand imposed by surging population growth. 
 
In  2000,  the  distribution  of  indices  for  coverage  by  collective  water  supply 
systems according to municipality was as shown in Figure 2. There is a higher 
concentration of municipalities with less satisfactory coverage in the North and 
Northeastern  regions  of  the  country—precisely  the  least  socio-economically 
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Source: IBGE (2004). 
Figure  2.  Water  supply  systems’  household  coverage,  according  to 
municipality. Brazil, 2000. 
 
One important facet of coverage data that is not directly revealed by the IBGE 
findings  is  the  form  in  which  the  supply  occurred—whether  with  regularity, 
whether the population is offered suitable tariff access, and whether potability 
standards  are  being  met,  among  other  variables.  It  is  suspected  that  service 
does  not  always  fulfill  requirements  for  what  is  considered  adequate;  this 
suspicion is reinforced when one notes the inconsistent financing of services and 
the operational constraints many have. 
 
Regarding  the  quality  of  water  provision,  Table  2  shows  that  security  is  not 
always guaranteed, given the acknowledged of incidence of pollution in weater 
sources and the existence of treatment processes that frequently are inadequate.    
As with all tables of variables related to sanitation, differences can be observed; 
those of a regional nature are quite distinct in this table. 
 
Table 2. Features of the water supply system by macro-region. Percentage 

















With conventional* water 
treatment, among those 
with surface water 
catchment, claiming  
contamination 
North  15,7  31,6  17,3  41,7 
Northeast  17,3  46,3  15,6  45,7 
Southeast  3,4  63,7  42.7  81,2 
South  16,0  34,9  37,6  87,0 
Central-
West 
11,6  46,9  27,9  97,5 
Brazil  12,1  48,9  32,3  77,5 
*Believed to be the most appropriate method of treatment for this type of water source. 
Source: IBG (2000b) 
Source: IBGE (2000b) 
 
Figure 3 represents a kind of map of health risks stemming from supplied water. 
It associates information on the water source, its pollution level and the type of 
treatment in use. When such a cross-reference is made it becomes evident that 
the most critical situations are distributed across different regions of the country, 
with  no  clear  concentration.  Certainly,  these  most  critical  situations  can  be 
explained by the significant presence of sources of pollution in water sources, as 
well as water treatment processes inappropriate for the type of intercepted water. 
 
 
    
 
KEY: Hydrographic Regions 
         State lines 
         Classes of Health Risk   Level 1    
                                                Level 2 
                                                Level 3   
Figure 3. Distribution of three levels of health risk due to quality of water 
distributed, according to states and hydrographic basins. Brazil, 2000. 
In  terms  of  water  quality  for  human  consumption,  the  impact  of  Ordinance 
518/2004 ought to be assessed. It was originally published in December 2000 as 
Ordinance  1469,  which  established  procedures  and  responsibilities  for 
monitoring and supervision of the quality of water for human consumption, and 
defines  the  standard  for  potability.  It  is  a  conceptually  advanced  piece  of 
legislation,  given  its  systematic  vision  of  of  guarantees  that  water  is  provided 
safely and of the protection of human health, [and] due to its innovativeness in 
terms of international trends. Such legislation, more because of its conceptual 
framework  than  its  actual  requirements,  should  impose  healthy  changes  in 
practices in the agencies. It will require time, effort, and determination on the part 
of administrative entities, given the stubborn points of view which prevail in the 
sector. 
The  same  kind  of  impact  is  expected  of  decree-law  5.440/2005,  which 
establishes  mechanisms  and  legal  instruments  for  providing  information  to 
consumers  on  the  quality  of  water  for  human  consumption,  which  may  bring 
about significant changes in process and in respect for the consumer on the part 
of agencies. 
As for sanitation, a growing, discrete trend is visible in the expansion of coverage 































Translation: See Figure 1 
Sources: IBGE/National Household Sample Survey [Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios] - 
PNAD (1992-1993, 1995-1999, 2001-2002),   IBGE/Demographic Census, 2000.    
 
Figure 4. Coverage by wastewater collection system. Brazil, total 
population, urban population, and rural population. 1991-2002. 
 
Over this period coverage by collection system increased 13 percentage points 
(from 62 to 75%) and rural population, while showing an increase in coverage, 
remained at just 16% of households with service; although there is room for 
debate over the most appropriate technological solution for dispersed 
populations. 
 
As in the case of water supply, the coverage indicator contains only partial data 
because information on the destination of effluents is not furnished.     
 
Here  it  is  important  to  consider  the  indicator’s  ambiguity,  since  the  mere 
existence of coverage by wastewater collection does not necessarily lead to real 
improvement in health and environmental conditions. In localities which are not 
provided with interceptors and wastewater treatment, the collection system may 
even  aggravate  human  health  problems—as  was  the  case  with  the  solution 
which  formerly  prevailed  where,  invariably,  effluents  infiltrated  the  subsoil  via 
different types of septic tanks, if they were working under average conditions. In 
this case the system ultimately concentrated wastewater in water bodies in the 
urban  environment,  exposing  populations  and  increasing  the  circulation  of 
pathogenic organisms in the environment. The simple presence of interceptors 
and treatment stations, given the frequently  reduced efficiency of the latter in 
removing pathogenic organisms, does not guarantee protection of human health 
and water quality in water bodies they have entered. 
 
On the issue of the nature of the service, the PNSE (IBGE, 2006) relates that 
4.097  (42%)  of  9.848  districts  possess  a  collection  system, but only  1.383 of 
them  have  treatment  stations  (14%  of  the  total).  Overall,  only  118  perform 
wastewater disinfection. Of the total volume of wastewater collected, only 35% is 
given  any  kind  of  treatment.  This  results  in  around  9,  400,000  m
3  of  raw 
wastewater discharged daily into water bodies across the country, only counting 
that which is collected by systems. 
  
Also worthy of note are data stating that 3,288 districts with systems (80%) do 
not possess any interceptor extension, which could possibly cause deterioration 
in the quality of water in receptacles located in urban pockets.  
 
Figure 5 represents coverage by sanitation collection, according to municipalities 
and  national  hydrographic  basins,  which  highlights  the  tendency  of  the  best 
indices of service to be concentrated in the country’s most developed regions. 
  
    
 
Source: IBGE (2004) 
Figure 5. Coverage by wastewater systems, according to cities (Brazil, 2000 
 
In contrast, Figure 6 shows the proportion of districts with wastewater treatment 
in each state. Even with the knowledge that in most districts which claim to have 
wastewater treatment, it is [only] partially efficient and has a level of population 
coverage  that  also  is  partial,  these  figures  point  negatively  to  the  fact  that 
Southern and Southwestern states—the most developed region in the country, 
are  among  those  with  the  worst  indices.  The  indices  point  positively  to  the 






    
 
Translation: Percentage of Districts with Wastewater Treatment 
State Capitol 
State line    
Hydrograohic Regions 
Figure 6. Proportion of districts with wastewater treatment, according to 
state and hydrogaphic basins. Brazil, 2000. 
 
When  assessing  the  delivery  of  services  to  the  population,  it  is  necessary  to 
highlight asymmetries. These can be found in different dimensions. Apart from 
the inequality of access associated with locality of residence—urban or rural—
there is also a clear, though unsurprising, relation to income: the poorest are the 
most excluded. Figure 7 illustrates this situation for water supply and sanitation, 






















Coverage (%)                         Water 
                                              Wastewater 
Average Monthly Income [SM 
[SM=salário mínimo=minimum wage] 
Source: Costa (2003) 
Figure 7. Water supply coverage by public system, and sanitation coverage 
by collection system in Brazil, according to income level. 
              Assymmetries  also  appear  when  analyzing  institutional  logic  and 
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Table 3. Urban Brazil, 2000. Water supply system coverage and sanitation 
system coverage, according to administrative model and macro-region, (% 
of households).  
   
 
 
Municipal 1* Municipal 2* Estadual Federal Particular Total
Macrorregião
Norte 22,09 6,18 41,09 0,24 30,40 100,00
Nordeste 13,01 6,74 75,09 0,29 4,88 100,00
Sudeste 27,97 11,28 56,60 0,00 4,14 100,00
Sul  13,75 6,30 66,29 0,09 13,57 100,00
Centro Oeste 13,67 4,56 74,49 3,87 3,42 100,00
Porte do município
Até 5 mil  26,86 3,02 60,90 0,16 9,06 100,00
5-20 mil 12,34 8,73 71,14 0,89 6,90 100,00
20-50 mil 9,51 17,48 63,11 0,19 9,71 100,00
50-200 mil 6,75 22,19 60,13 0,64 10,29 100,00
mais de 200 mil 8,00 19,00 67,00 0,00 6,00 100,00
IDH municipal
Baixo 40,00 0,00 46,67 0,00 13,33 100,00
Médio 18,19 6,75 66,67 0,50 7,90 100,00
Alto 21,04 17,04 49,74 0,00 12,17 100,00
Municipal 1* Municipal 2* Estadual Federal Particular Total
Macrorregião
Norte 37,93 6,90 34,48 0,00 20,69 100,00
Nordeste 83,16 3,85 11,54 0,00 1,46 100,00
Sudeste 57,92 11,25 28,89 0,00 1,94 100,00
Sul  55,65 5,54 38,58 0,00 0,22 100,00
Centro Oeste 33,75 10,00 53,75 0,00 2,50 100,00
Porte do município
Até 5 mil  78,75 2,31 18,37 0,00 0,58 100,00
5-20 mil 69,66 6,32 22,09 0,00 1,92 100,00
20-50 mil 42,16 17,30 38,11 0,00 2,43 100,00
50-200 mil 25,48 23,95 46,77 0,00 3,80 100,00
mais de 200 mil 10,31 18,56 67,01 0,00 4,12 100,00
IDH municipal
Baixo 100,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 100,00
Médio 66,12 6,26 25,86 0,00 1,76 100,00
Alto 46,75 20,48 31,08 0,00 1,69 100,00
Fonte: elaboração própria a partir de IBGE: Censo Demográfico 2000.
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Translation Key:                                                               Water Supply 
Level 2 Variables 
Adminstrative Models: Municipal 1   Municipal 2  State  Federal  Private   Total 
Macro-region 
Size of Municipality 
Up to 5,000    
5-20,000 
20-50,000   
50-200,000 
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Water Supply 
Level 2 Variables: 
Adminstrative Models: Municipal 1   Municipal 2  State  Federal  Private   Total 
Macro-region 
Size of Municipality 
Up to 5,000 
5-20,000 







Municipal 1 = Direct administration + participation of public authorities 
Municipal 2  = Local government 
 
Source: Rezende (2005), based on IBGE (2000a)
 and IBGE (2000b) 
 
The table indicates that the model PLANASA envisioned—that of administration 
through state companies—has not achieved universal coverage for all strata of 
municipalities, almost three decades after the plan’s implementation. In fact, it is 
obvious that the model: 
 
- Privileged water supply to the detriment of sanitation (for reasons of economic-
financial viability); 
 
- Was unsuccessful in expanding as intended into the municipalities of the least 
developed  regions  (perhaps  because  in  these  regions  a  greater  proportion  of 
municipalities excercised their rights of autonomy and did not offer concession 
contracts); 
 
- Nor was water supply extended further (via state companies] into municipalities 
with the highest HDI, due to the fact that these were stronger politically, and their 
agencies  more  financially  profitable  because  they  were  kept  under  municipal 
management; 
 
- Less priority in sanitation was given municipalities with under 20,000 residents, 
clearly for reasons of economic-financial viability. 
    
Evidence  of  this  kind  points  to  the  hypothesis  that  the  state  model,  probably 
because  of  the  entrepeneurial  character  of  its  design,  helped  to  enlarge 
assymmetries. 
 
When  percentages  of  coverage  are  disaggregated according  to administrative 
and  features  of  the  municipality  (Table  3)  it  appears  that  the  state  model  is 
equivalent  to  the  municipal  model  in  terms  of  effectiveness  of  service—
particularly the performance of local municipalities in water supply. Apart from 
that, the table shows that, actually, the municipalities that received more attention 
are the most developed (higher HDI) and have the largest population, both in 











Translation; See Table 3 
Table 4. Urban Brazil, 2000. Water supply system and sanitation system 
coverage, according to administrative model, municipal HDI, and size of 
municipality. 
Municipal 1  = Direct administration + Participation of public authorities 
Municipal 2 = Local government 
 
Source: Rezende (2005), based on IBGE (2000a) and IBGE (2000b) 
 
            3.2. Limitations on data provided by indicators 





Municipal 1 90,70 40,54





IDH baixo - < 0.500 63,89 2,23
IDH médio - 0.500 - 0.799 85,69 43,98
IDH alto - > 0.799 95,11 74,05
Porte do município
Até 5 mil 85,15 31,79
de 5 a 20 mil 85,85 41,16
de 20 a 50 mil 87,32 49,64
de 50 a 200 mil 89,50 56,36
acima de 200 mil 92,80 69,47
Fonte: elaboração própria a partir de IBGE: Censo Demográfico 2000.   
 
On this point a critical discussion is taking place as to the quality of data these 
indicators provide. The debate has been conducted in published works in the 
literature of the field, but it calls for more analysis. To illustrate: one salient fact is 
that, depending  on the criteria being adopted to define what suitable service on 
the part of agencies would be, a population deficit of either 171 million residents 
(8%) can result for the urban population in 2000 in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
and the Carribbean --when a more tolerant concept is used--or 690 to 970 million 
(28-46%) when a more demanding definition is employed for access to water 
supply. The same comparison, when applied to sanitation, yields figures of  394 
million(19%0) as against 850 to 1.130 million (42-56%) (4). 
 
On the other hand, when assessing coverage statistics officially released by the 
WHO and UNICEF (2000) for countries in Asia and Africa, Satterthwaite (2003) 
questions, for example,  why official data indicate that only 4% of Kenya’s urban 
population  were  without  sanitation  services  in  2000,  given  that  about  half  the 
population  in  the  capital  city  Nairobi  live  in  informal  housing.  In  these  areas 
conditions  can  be  so  daunting  that  150  in  every  1000  children  die  before 
reaching the age of five; a small proportion of domiciles have their own toilet, and 
it is common for as much as 200 people to share the same pit latrine. The author 
also questions the figure that there is 98% sanitation coverage in Tanzania, since 
local surveys have been showing that a high proportion of the urban population 
use inferior-quality pit latrines, very often shared, which frequently overflow due 
to flooding.  As for water supply in India, while statistics show 92% coverage of 
the  urban  population  by  “improved”  services,  studies  have  shown  that 
inadequacies in this provision affect 30%  to 60 % of the population.  
 
Both the debate on quality and the omissions that occur in indicators from official 
sources, as well as that concerning the importance to health of the various 
dimensions in which services are provided,  were the subjects of a field study 
done in the city of Betim, in Minas Gerais (Brazil), with 160,000 residents (Heller, 
19990). The research, consisting of a case-control type epidemiological study 
which investigated morbidity from diarrheia in children up to the age of five, 
raised several questions in the context of the discussion about access, as 
summarized below: 
 
[Translator’s Note: colored text below, with footnotes, is extracted by the author from the English-language 
text of the study]   
 
a) What proportion of the population is actually connected to the public 
water supply network? 
In the research, the proportion of the population connected to the public water supply 
network was actually found to be higher than that officially registered. Table 5 shows 
coverage according to three different sources.    





This difference, with greater coverage indicated by the epidemiological research which is 
based on household sample, is due to the high incidence of clandestine connections which 
are  neither  accounted  for  in  the  official  statistics  of  the  concessionaire  nor  in  the 
demographic  census.  The  smaller  coverage  observed  in  the  census  can  probably  be 
explained by the fact that the survey was undertaken two years before the other surveys. 
(b) To what risk is the unconnected population to water supply exposed? 
In the study, the 1.6 per cent of the population which is supposedly unconnected to the 
water distribution network, and which is basically supplied by shallow wells, showed no 
statistically significant relative risk of diarrhoea. There are two possible explanations: the 
insufficient sample size which prevents the identification of any statistically significant 
associations, and the absence of risk to this population which would compensate for a 
deficient water supply through adequate hygiene practice.
a 
                                                 
a Na literatura epidemiológica observa-se tanto ausência de associação entre abastecimento de água e diarréia (Ryder et 
al. 1985) ou com mortalidade até cinco anos (Lindskog et al., 1988), quanto a presença dessa relação com enteric 
infections (Chambers et al., 1989; Georges-Courbot et al., 1990), giardiasis (Chute et al. 1987. In Brazil, one study 
(Gross et al., 1989) identified the impact of the construction of a water distribution network on the incidence of 
diarrhoea, Victora et al. (1988) showed the significant health risk of infant mortality from diarrhoea in families without 
piped water, Azevedo et al. (2005) mostraram uma possível redução na ocorrência de diarréia e de desnutrição crônica, 
sendo que estudo em crianças residindo em áreas de invasão urbana revelou que o uso de água do sistema público 
implica menos casos de parasitoses de transmissão feco-oral (Teixeira e Heller, 2006) e menos casos de diarréia 
(Teixeira e Heller, 2005). Thus, the results of the epidemiological studies developed for several socio-economic and 
water supply conditions do not allow a definitive statement about the health risk of the population not supplied by 
public systems, regardless of the specific reality.    
(c) Can it be assumed that the population connected to the distribution network has a safe 
water supply? 
To answer this question, the following aspects were analyzed: the quality of the water; 
the existence of an intermittent supply, with the consequent risk of water contamination; 
the per capita water consumption. 
 
Any violation of the drinking water standards imposes both biological and chemical 
health risks to consumers. Moreover, it is important to recognize the distribution 
network’s own dynamics which may cause a deterioration in the water quality through 
biofilm formation (an organic or inorganic surface deposit inside pipe walls which can 
cause the growth of pathogenic micro-organisms) or the introduction of contaminants. 
The latter can take place as a result of intermittent supply or factors which cause low 
water pressure in the mains. 
 
In Betim, intermittent supply was reported by 44 per cent of the residents interviewed, yet 
a significant risk of diarrhoea was not identified. It is possible that, because of the general 
Brazilian  practice  of  domestic  water  storage,  people’s  perception  of  intermittence  is 
biased  due  to  their  domestic  water  tank’s  capacity  to  absorb  variations  in  flow. 
Intermittence may be identified by physical and continuous pressure measurements in the 
distribution system and, only with this information, is an epidemiological risk analysis 
feasible
b.  
The  other  health  risk  factor  generally  related  to  water  supply  is  level  of  water 
consumption. In Betim, a possible risk of diarrhoea in children living in houses with low 
per capita water consumption (less than 125 litres/person/day in the lower socioeconomic 
stratum  and  less  than  75  litres/person/day  in  the  higher  socio-economic  stratum)  was 
identified. The average consumption in the city was 145 litres/person/day. More in-depth 
research on the link between water consumption and health in urban zones with high per 
capita consumption is still necessary. A large number of epidemiological studies have 
indicated the greater importance to health of water quantity over water quality. However, 
these studies were developed under conditions where per capita consumption was in the 
order  of  10-40  litres/person/day,  much  lower  than  that  of  urban  areas  with  in-house 
connections. 
 
(d) To what extent does intra-domestic water-handling influence health risk? 
 
The following points were analyzed: the role of the domestic water tank; provision for 
indoor plumbing; hygiene practices. 
The research carried out in Betim examined the effects of having a domestic water tank. 
Households lacking such a tank (and presumably storing water in household vessels) 
                                                 
b Burns et al. (1993) concluded that, in Beira, Mozambique, the intermittent water supply led to the search for 
alternative ground water supply sources; frequently, these sources were contaminated and their use was 
associated with increases in the occurrence of diarrhoea and cholera.     
were  found  to  have  an  increased  risk  of  diarrhoea.  This  result  does  not  confirm  the 
hypothesis  that  the  existence  of  a  domestic  water  tank  implies  a  health  risk  due  to 
inadequate maintenance. However, the study highlights the fact that the lack of a roof 
tank indicates the presence of only basic indoor plumbing, usually only a water point on 
the plot, causing a risk of infectious and parasitic diseases. 
 
The  importance  of  hygienic  practices  was  demonstrated  in  the  Betim  research.  Four 
practices  were  investigated:  washing  and  disinfection  of  fruit  and  vegetables;  care  of 
drinking  water;  handwashing  before  eating;  and  hand-washing  after  defecation.  After 
statistical  analysis,  only  the  first  practice  showed  a  statistically  significant 
epidemiological  risk,  the  greatest  risk  found  among  all  the  environmental  exposures 
investigated, pinpointing the role of hygienic practices in the control of infectious and 
parasitic diseases. The risks to health from eating fruit and vegetables that have not been 
washed suggest the use of irrigation water contaminated with sewage, a common practice 
in the metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte. The fact that the three other practices were 
not significant in the statistical analysis possibly means that food hygiene is a surrogate 
for general household hygiene. 
(e)  How should waste water collection be factored into health protection? 
Generally, the statistics relate the existence of a connection to a sewerage system to a 
definition of adequate provision for waste water disposal. The assumption behind this is 
that  residents  of  houses  connected  to  sewers  are  protected  and  those  of  unconnected 
houses are exposed to health problems due to the presence of excreta and grey water 
(waste water from general household use) in the environment. Two questions arise: (i) in 
a  locality  with  only  a  partial  sewerage  system,  is  the  connected  population  really 
protected  against  excreta  and  grey  water  presence  in  the  environment?  (2)  do  the 
solutions adopted by the unconnected population expose them to a risk of contamination? 
The results obtained from the research in Betim illustrate this discussion. Two variables 
relating to waste water collection were analyzed, namely, the kind of solution adopted 
and the free-flowing presence of waste water in the streets. After a statistical analysis, the 
variable relating to solutions for waste water disposal showed no statistical significance 
whilst the variable relating to the presence of free waste water flowing in the streets 
showed a significant risk. From this result, one can conclude that the determinant factor 
linking health protection and waste water disposal is the absence of free-flowing waste 
water in the environment. House connection to the sewerage system is less relevant than 
the overall quality of the solutions adopted in each drainage sub-basin, and the upstream 
solutions determine the risks to downstream dwellings. 
In practice, the study suggests that if waste water disposal is approached from a public 
health point of view, then the unit of intervention must be the drainage sub-basin. With 
this  approach,  all  the  waste  water  in  each  sub-basin  needs  to  be  disposed  of,  with 
connections to adequate sewer systems or with adequate on-site solutions in order to 
avoid overflows into the streets.    
(f) What is the role of interception and treatment of waste water?   
It is not only local disposal of waste water but also interception and treatment which 
determine health risk for the population, although these are rarely referred to. Obviously, 
the risk affects specific populations, revealing again the perversity of exposure to waste 
water: inadequate solutions do not necessarily imply risk to the owners of the solutions, 
but to the population downstream. 
In  the  case  of  lack  of  interception,  those  who  live  on  the  banks  of  the  stream  are 
specifically affected; and the absence of treatment exposes not only the population beside 
the water to risk but also all the urban population which is supplied with vegetables 
irrigated with contaminated water. Statistics on levels of interception need to be better 
improved  in  Brazil.  Research  into  coverage  by  treatment  utilities  has  been  purely 
quantitative, with a generic classification of treatment processes and no evaluation of 
levels of pathogen removal nor any in-depth analysis of the health risk to downstream 
populations. 
 
Thus  it  may  be  said,  at  least  on  the  basis  of  these  references,  that  where 
indicators  are  used  to  describe  a  given  situation  of  access  to  services,  they 
should be constrained by methodological safeguards, and care should be taken 
to  suitably  qualify  the  information.  Such  caution  is  important  when  the  same 
reality is temporally compared using surveys based on different methodologies 
(see, for example, the difference in results between the census survey and the 
sample survey findings and in figures 1 and 4), and becomes even more so when 
different realities are compared, particularly nations. In the latter case, apart from 
possible  methodological  differences  that  occur  in  surveys,  the  socio-cultural 
construction of the concept of access itself which prevails in the population, or 
how  access  is  institutionally  conceptualized  by  agents  responsible  for  the 




4. Successful models and innovative experiments 
 
 As this text points out, while water supply and sanitation experiments in Brazil 
might  have  been  promoted  more  effectively  than  has  in  fact  occurred,  it  is 
important to recognize that in  terms of the population’s access to services that 
protect human health and the environment, various localities have indeed found 
the capacity to excel in the quality of service they provide. The quality of service 
might vary in its characteristics, as in cases where agencies were able to achieve 
universal  access,  or  where  agencies,  though  they  did  not  achieve  this,  did 
develop  innovative  public  policies  which  worked  in  that  direction,  or  where 
appropriate technological solutions with the potential to bring about greater social 
inclusion  were  found.  The  present  section  seeks  to  highlight  four  groups  of 
experiments of this kind.  
 
    
a)  Municipal cooperatives 
 
Municipal cooperatives in rural zones for water supply and sanitation was a model 
introduced in Brazil during the 1990’s. It has been recognized as a successful 
form of morganization of a group of municipalities for this purpose. The central 
idea of the model is that, given the difficulty a single rural locality alone faces in 
ensuring  adequate  delivery  of  service,  particularly  in  light  of  its  small  scale,  it 
should be possible for rural localities to group together based on geographical 
links,  and  to  organize  a  supra-municipal  authority  with  the  technical  and 
administrative  capacity  to  provide  the  support  they  need.  It  is  a  form  of  self-
organization  of  services,  with  little  state  and  federal  government  participation. 
Movements  across  the  country  are  coalescing  in  favor  of  expanding  the 
experiment, and doing so for urban nuclei as well.  
 
o  CENTRAL, Bahia 
 
One of these experiments was carried out in the state of Bahia via CENTRAL –
the  Community  Association  Forum  for  Water  Supply  Systems  Maintenance 
[Central  de  Associações  Comunitárias  para  a  Manutenção  de  Sistemas  de 
Abastecimento  de  Água]—created  by  agreement  between  the  Bahia  state 
government and the German bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). It is a 
non-profit association open to the participation of community associations that 
monitor the operations of water supply systems. Its objectives are: l) financially 
ensure the systems’ functional operations, via collection on the basis of tariffs for 
metered  connections;  ll)  promote  ways  of  improving  the  affiliated  community 
associations’  operations  in  terms  the  systems’  management;  lll)  represent  the 
associations and advocate for their interests before public and private entities.  
The affiliated community associations are responsible for operating the systems; 
CENTRAL  is  responsible  for  the  systems’  maintenance  and  for  providing 
management, technical, and administrative support. There were 37 associations 
in 1999 (Prince, 1999a) 
    
CENTRAL  is  administered  by  the  following  authorities:  a  general  meeting,  an 
executive board, a managing committee, and a finance committee. The executive 
board meets every three months and is composed of four representatives of the 
community  associations,  two  representatives  of  the  mayor’s  office,  one 
representative  of  the  CERB-Bahia  State  Rural  Engineering  Company  
[Companhia Estadual de Engenharia Rural da Bahia] and one representative of 
the German consulting corporation supporting the cooperative. All the members of 
the executive board and finance committee are elected at the general meeting 
from  among  the  community  associations’  representatives.  As  of  1999  the 
cooperative was composed of five staff members in a well-rationalized structure 
(Prince, 1999a). 
    
In an assessment of community participation during the introduction of four water 
supply  systems  (3),  Prince  (1999a)  says  that:  when  the  project  was  being 
designed  community  involvement  was  principally  in  terms  of  communication, 
since  there  was  only  one  technological  solution  to  consider  due  to  regional 
limitations  on  water  use;  that  there  was  practically  no  participation  during  the 
system’s  installation,since  construction  was  out-sourced  to  construction 
companies;  that  in  terms  of  the  system’s  administration  and  operations  the 
community  acted  through  the  respective  community  association;  and  that    the 
community  participated  via  its  association  in  matters  of  administration  and  the 
setting  of  tariffs.  Overall,  there  was  significant  community  involvement  in 
sanitation education programs. 
 
o SISAR, Ceará 
 
Another institution which has received much national (9) and international(10) 
recognition  is  SISAR-  Ceara  State  Coordinated  Rural  Sanitation  System  –
[Sistema Integrado de Saneamento Rural, no Estado do Ceará], created in 1996 
and  heavily  inspired  by  the  experiment  in  Bahia,  although  SISAR  included 
sanitation services as well. It has an independent legal status similar to that of 
CENTRAL’s,  and  the  following  objectives:  (l)  to  administer,  maintain,  and 
coordinate  operations  for  all  its  associates’  supplies  of  treated  water,  and  
sanitation systems (ll) set, and secure payment for, realistic tariffs consistent with 
fundamentals of self-management, (lll) represent the affiliated associations, and 
(lV) promote sanitation education, along with greater involvement in associations. 
Contracts  with  each  system’s  operator  are  executed  by  the  respective  users’ 
associations; in some cases the operator is employed by the mayor’s office. In 
1999 there were 32 associations affiliated with SISAR. Terms of adherence to 
SISAR’s  technical  standards  apply  to  any  agency  seeking  membership  in  the 
organization (all building connections must possess a hydrometer; there must be 
a macro-meter in the water production unit and appropriate electrical facilities, 
and  facilities  must  be  free  of  problems  in  their  physical  construction),  and 
agences must have a suitably functioning users’ association. (Prince, 1999b). 
 
SISAR’s supervisory bodies consist of a general meeting, a board of directors, a 
financial committee, and an auditing and managing executive committee. The 
general meeting consists of one representative of each affiliated association, and 
is responsible for selecting the board of directors and finance committee from 
among its members. The managing executive committee is charged with taking 
necessary measures to ensure the organization’s functional operations, and is 
composed  of  a  manager  and  professionals  in  the  fields  of  maintenance, 
business, and education (Prince,1999b). 
 
Sarmento (2001) made a comparative assessment of six experiments in low-cost 
sanitation in poor communities. Four of them, including SISAR, were projects to  
introduce a condominial sanitation system (11). The three other experiments with 
condominial systems were conducted using different management models. In his 
conclusions, he testifies to the SISAR organizational model’s contributions to the    
success  of  technologies  that  called  for  active  community  participation  and 
involvement.  Strengthening  a  community  by  means  of  a  users’  association  is 
considered a differentiating factor among the experiments. Of six experiments, 
SISAR  was  the  only  one  that  achieved  service  delivery  to  100%  of  the 
population;  second  in  how  few  users  stated  there  were  problems  in  system 
operations; first in user satisfaction with the service; and the only one to have a 
continuing  program for  community  involvement  and  sanitation education  in  its 
administrative structure.  
 
In its description of innovative experiments in urban services, IBAM (2006) called 
SISAR  an  “alternative  to  the  privatization  of  sanitation  services,  providing  a 
management  model  within  the  public  sphere,  and  reaping  the  benefits  of 
government/community partnerships. 
 
o  Public consortium, Piauí 
 
This involves plans for organizing the urban areas of Piauí, currently operated by 
the state company–AGESPISA, into a public consortium, a model similar to that 
of  cooperatives.  The  planning  was  carried  out  by  the  National  Department  of 
Environmental  Sanitation  [Secretaria  Nacional  de  Saneamento  Ambiental-
SNSA], part of the Ministry of Cities, and the data used here was extracted from 
studies prepared by that department (PMSS, 2005).  
Previous studies by SNSA itself have pointed out the “need for drastic changes in 
the company (AGESPISA)in order to attempt a restructuring sufficient to increase 
its  technical  and  financial  viability”,  given  its  low  organizational  quality.  While 
formally  responsible for  water  supply  and sanitation  throughout state  territory, 
AGESPISA supplies water in only 161 municipal centers out of the current 222 
(72.5% of the total). It delivers sanitation services only to the capital, Teresina, 
with systems covering only about 12% of the population, in addition to a few 
isolated  residential  complexes  in  the  state’s  interior.  Among  the  municipal 
centers where it  does supply water there is a clear opting for those of larger 
scale; nearly all of those with an urban population above 5,000 residents are 
served. Of cities with less than 5,000 residents 35.1% are not served by the state 
company.   
Based  on  this  situation,  SNSA’s  studies  for  reformulating  the  state’s 
administrative model proposed a physical and population-based re-division of the 
municipalities, in which AGESPISA would retain responsibility for service delivery 
in the capital and in 35 municipal centers in the state’s interior (1,358,000 users, 
or 75% of the state’s urban population), geographically concentrated in an area 
running from the extreme North to the Southern-Central areas. In the remaining 
187  smaller-scale  centers,  which  together  correspond  to  465,015  users,  the 
model would combine municipal intervention with adminstration by four yet-to-be 
organized regional cooperatives. The cooperatives are formally designated as “a    
public consortium with state and municipal participation” and will be legally based 
on the Law for Consortiums (no. 11.107, of 06/04/2005), which regulates the joint 
administration  of  services  via  cooperation  among  federated  entities.  This  law 
guarantees  administrative  and  financial  autonomy  to  such  an  organization 
formed  under  public  law,  along  with  the  opportunity  to  assume  functions 
characteristic of public authorities. 
The studies reason that, among the institutional models that are applicable, those 
which rely on “entities solely of state nature, that is, under the exclusive aegis of 
the  state  government  [...].  would  not,  generally  speaking,  be  suitable  in  the 
present case of Piauí, given the risks of their being tainted with the stigma of 
politics and the associated inefficient delivery of sevices—which could mean a 
mere  repetition—now  four-fold—of  the  AGESPISA  model”.  The  study  further 
proposes that the new operators “have their authority more ‘diluted’ between the 
states and municipalities, arrived at via consensus among a significant number of 
city  administrations  and  the  state  government,  which  would  allow  for 
management that is more professional and democratic”. (original quotes). 
The model posits, on the one hand, a division of duties between the consortia 
and member municipalities and, on the other hand, the use of a compound tariff 
prorated between the two management levels. 
For  water  supply,  investments  would  initially  be  made  in  each  system  for 
adjustments  made  to  each  system  of  distribution,  the  installation  of  water 
treatment facilities, the automation of electric facilities, and macro- and micro-
metering  of  water.  The  municipality  would  then  take  over  activities  of  a  local 
nature,  hiring  and  allocating  the  necessary  personnel,  to  be  trained  by  the 
consortium. These activities would include, among other tasks,  daily operations, 
monitoring  the more basic  water  quality  parameters,  collecting  water  samples 
and sending them along for analysis, reading hydrometers, and delivering bills, 
among other duties.  
In turn the consortium would be responsible for activities of greater complexity, or 
those  which  offer  economies  of  scale.  These  would  include  larger-scale 
preventive  and  corrective  maintenance  measures,  monitoring  water  quality, 
monitoring  non-compliance,  planning  and  preparing  studies  and  projects, 
licensing and concessions, supervising acquisitions and larger-scale construction 
projects,  supplying  chemical  products,  billing,  monitoring  tariff  collection,  and 
inter-institution coordination among state and federal entities 
From  a  financial  perspective,  the  model  focuses  on  coping  with  the  state 
company’s accumulated setbacks, and the fact that the small municipalities in 
question are those traditionally considered by state companies to be precisely 
those which are unprofitable, and whose profitability can only be guaranteed by 
the mechanism of cross-subsidies, through which they can benefit from the larger 
systems’ surpluses.    
SNSA  documents  suggest  that,  in  response,  the  model  seeks  to  reverse 
AGESPISA’s two main defects, “high salaries, [...] in company headquarters and 
also for local staff, even the small municipalities”, and “the company’s centralized 
operations, in which all support activities—corrective maintenance, water quality, 
and marketing and sales, among others—are executed out of Teresina, with large 
expenses  for  displacement”.  Given  these  factors,  the  new  model  begins  with 
“personnel  costs  closer  to  the  reality  of  the  state  interior”,  and  envisions  “the 
headqarters  of  the  new  operators,  now  four  in  number,  [as]  having  more 
satisfactory logistical arrangements”.    
In organizational terms the consortia would have an executive team consisting of 
an  executive  director,  a  technical  consulting  staff for  sanitation, two  managers 
(financial-administrative and sales-operations) and an executive secretary. On the 
operational  level  there  would  be  three  teams:  for  administrative  support, 
maintenance and quality control, and sales and marketing. On the municipal level 
there would be local teams of varying nature and size, depending on two factors: 
the system’s size, and whether there needs to be more a complex facility for water 
treatment. 
In general, the executive and operational authorities envisioned by the consortium 
in the southern region would be configured as represented in Fig. 8. 
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Figure 8 – Diagram representing operational and executive levels of the consortium 
for the region of South-Piauí and local sanitation agencies 
Economic-financial studies prepared by SNSA conclude that average tariffs need 
to be such that, when applied to family consumption of 10m³/month, would result 
in monthly costs of between R$ 8.10 and R$ 10.20 (US$ 3.70 and 4.60).The tariff 
structure currently employed by the state-company provider for the same monthly 
consumption  is  over  R$  20.00  (US  $  9.00).  The  studies  only  consider  water 
supply,  but  they  suggest  that  incorporating  sanitaion  services  would  optimize 
structures  and  resources,  making  the  model  even  more  sustainable 
economically.  
The model proposed for Piauí, while consistent with important premises such as 
that of strengthening local power and the decentralization and self-organization 
of service providers, apparently will soon be considered financially healthy as 
well, and employing a tarriff policy that favors the principle of access to services 
even  for  the  lowest-income  populations.  Indeed,  the  possibility  of  employing 
social  (increasing-block,  or  subsidized)  tariffs  could  even  further  increase  the 
potential for universal participation in water supply and sanitation systems.   
Several  concluding  observations  may  be  made  concerning  the  model  of 
organizing  through    municipal  cooperatives.  Certainly  this  is  a  form  of 
organization  with  significant  potential  for  improving  the  delivery  of  services  in 
small-scale  communities  which,  by  themselves,  possess  little  technical-
administrative capacity.  The model truly employs—in the field of water supply 
and sanitation—the cooperative principle which has been successfully applied in 
various other sectors of society, and in different parts of the world.  In Brazil the 
cooperatives  have  functioned  for  many  years  in  sectors  as  diverse  as  the 
production and distribution of milk and the delivery of health services. 
 
The recent announcement of  specific legislation to form consortia  for delivering 
services – Law no. 11.107 of 06/04/2005 – may serve as a legal basis and an 
incentive to muster support for the model. In any case, the three experiments 
described  above  do  provide  lessons  which  should  serve  to  guide  new 
experiments.  Firstly,  there  is  the  importance  of  external  financing,  especially 
governmental, to allow for the organization’s first steps and for introducing the 
units.  Second  is  the  importance  of  technical  assistance  in  the  areas  of 
engineering,  law,  and  administration  in  the  first  stages  of  organizing  the 
cooperative, and also afterwards, until it achieves sustainability. 
 
In sum, the model holds significant potential for scale-up in various regions of the 
country,  whether  in  rural  areas  or  uniting  small,  geographically-close  urban 
nuclei—or even for organizations in charge of both urban and rural sanitation in a 
given region. But it would be mistaken to view this experiment simply as a model 
of  social  self-  organization,  over  which  the  government  has  no  responsibility. 
Here,  as  in  various  other  aspects  of  water  supply  and  sanitation,  public    
authorities have a central role to play in creating positive conditions for efficiency, 
effectiveness, and sustainability in the delivery of services.    
 
  
b)  Experiments in municipalities 
 
As  has  been  noted  elsewhere  in  this  document,  beginning  in  the  1970’s  the 
model  of  municipal  management  of  services  found  no  support  in  the  official 
policies of the federal government, which opted clearly for the state company 
model—a situation that has been changing only recently. The policy choice left 
nearly  all  municipalities,  which  had  opted  to  continue  managing  their  own 
services,  without  access  to  financing—a    vital  tool  for  coping  with  population 
growth and obsolete systems—or state or federal technical support for at least 20 
years. 
 
In  spite  of  this,  many  municipalities  managed  to  consolidate  quality  services, 
relying mainly on their own organizational and financial efforts. 
   
In 2005, ASSEMAE – The National Association of Municipal Sanitation Agencies 
[Associação  Nacional  dos  Serviços  Municipais  de  Saneamento]  produced  a 
publication describing 20 successful municipal experiments (ASSEMAE, 2005). 
The experiments were selected through a process of consultation with specialists 
using the Delphi method;  a questionnaire, answered in two stages, in which the 
principles adopted for characterizing an experiment as a success are laid out 
(12),  Below  is  a  brief  description  of  some  of  the  experiments  included  in  the 
publication.  
 
o  Alagoinhas, Bahia (140,000 residents) 
 
Alagoinhas, located in a disadvantaged region of the state of Bahia, north of its 
capital Salvador, has been able to overcome the obstacles its socio-geographic 
location  presents,    adopting  a  sanitation  service  that  is  participatory  and 
committed to the population. In 2001 the municipality approved a law creating a 
municipal policy for environmental sanitation, believed to be Brazil’s first of its 
kind.  The  law  was  formulated  after  a  highly  participatory  process.  Seventeen 
regional  pre-conferences  and  four  participatory  thematic  and  analytical  pre-
conferences,  in  which  5,000  people  participated,  culminated  in  a  municipal 
conference  on  environmental  sanitation  attended  by  166  delegates,  some  of 
them  elected  in  the  previous  stages  and  others  appointed  by  the  municipal 
government. 
 
In  a  contractual  arrangement  with  the  Federal  University  of  Bahia,  the 
municipality developed a municipal plan for environmental sanitation to guide its 
actions. Thanks to these municipally-organized efforts there occurred a visible 
expansion  in  access  to  water  supply—including  the  introduction  of  micro-
metering—and  sanitation  services,  and  a  significant  reduction  in  infant    
mortality—from 46 to 26 deaths prior to one year of age per thousand live births 
between  1999  and  2003.  Advances  such  as  these  have  received  national 
recognition.  One  of  the  country’s  well-known  magazines  singled  it  out  as  “a 
revolution in the teeth of chaos”, given the adversity of local conditions. 
 
o  Araraquara, São Paulo (200,000 residents) 
 
This city is noted for having achieved universal delivery of services.  The entire 
urban  population  receives  water  that  meets  potability  standards,  with  100% 
micro-metering, and its  wastewater its collected and treated. The investments 
that ensured this status have been drawn from its own resources, gathered from 
tariffs known to be modest and lower than cities of equivalent scale.  Even so, 
the agency has been creative in its dealings with consumers unable to pay tariffs: 
it has created a social fund assembled from 1% of tariff receipts, which is used to 
redeem the debts of consumers who demonstrate their income is insufficient. 
Appropriate  administration,  reinforcing  the  population’s  involvement  in  the 
process and organizing its initiatives with the help of master plans, is ensuring 
that services are sustainable. The excellence of this service delivery has been 
reaching international standards: water treatment and wastewater treatment have 
received ISO 9001 certification in recent years. 
The  local  institution  responsible,  DAAE,  scaled-up  the  scope  of  its  activities 
starting in 2003,  assuming complete administrative responsibility for urban solid 
waste,  including  health  clinic  waste.  For  this  purpose,  it has  invested  its own 
funds to introduce a recycling factory, for the creation of agency branch offices, 
for  organizing  the  work  of  a  recycling  cooperative,  for  suitable  operation  of a 






o  Ibiporã, Paraná (50,000 residents) 
    
SAMAE  –  the  Ibipora  Municipal  Agency  for  Water  and  Sanitation  [Serviço 
Municipal de Água e Esgotos de Ibiporã] has been a standout in the quality of its 
delivery  of  services,  and  is  seen  as  a  standard  of  comparison  for  other 
municipalities. It was the first municipal agency to win the National Award for 
Quality in Sanitation Services, presented by ABES – The Brazilian Association 
for  Environmental  and  Sanitation  Engineering  [Associação  Brasileira  de 
Engenharia Sanitária e Ambiental], receiving ISO 9001 certification in 2003. It 
has achieved virtually universal service water supply and wastewater collection 
and treatment for the municipality’s urban and rural population. In its rural areas 
work has been performed in unison with the state company in charge of technical 
assistance and rural extension.  It has exceeded the number of water analyses 
required by Brazilian legislation for measuring potability, and includes additional 
complex analyses, such as those for agrotoxins and heavy metals. 
The agency has a broad management and policy philosophy. It participated in 
the founding and establishment of the Intermunicipal Consortium for Municipal 
Sanitation  Services  in  Northern  Paranà  [Consórcio  Intermunicipal  de  Serviços 
Municipais de Saneamento do Norte do Paraná], inspired by federal legislation in 
2005 for public consortia. Among its planned initiatives the consortium intends to: 
establish  a  common  laboratory  for  water  analysis,  enter  into agreements  with 
engineering, legal, and surveying professionals in order to provide consortium 
members  with  technical  assistance,  and,  most  importantly,  promote  the 
exchange of ideas and experiences among the 11 associated municipalities. 
  
o  Ituiutaba, Minas Gerais (90,000 residents) 
 
SAE  –Ituiutaba’s  Office  of  the  Superintendent  of  Water  and  Sanitation  
[Superintendência de Água e Esgotos de Ituiutaba] possesses excellent service 
delivery indices for water supply and wastewater collection for it’s urban area, 
treating  about  70%  of  its  collected  wastewater  in  stabilization  ponds.  The 
excellence of its services have won recognition; it has won the National Award 
for Quality in Sanitaiton Service awarded by ABES –[Brazilian Association for 
Sanitation  and,Environmental  Engineering],  and  ISO  9002  certification  for  its 
water treatment facility. The Office of the Superintendent places high priority on 
its program to combat losses in water supply, replacing systems and detecting 
leaks using modern techniques. 
On  the  management  level,  SAE  uses  indicators  for  monitoring  service;  100 
management indicators are recorded and assessed monthly. It has emphasized 
its relationship with users of the services, encouraging it’s staff to follow through 
on that committment and conducting post-service delivery studies that sample 
users who have requested local government services.  According to its directors,    





o  Penápolis, São Paulo (60,000 residents) 
 
Water supply and sanitation services in Penápolis was one of 15 experiments to 
be considered  “fine sanitation practice” in a competition held by the WWF-Brazil 
in  2005  (WWF,  2005).The  Penápolis  Independent  Department  of  Water  and 
Sewers-  DAEP  [Departamento  Autônomo  de  Água  e  Esgoto  de  Penápolis], 
responsible  for  municipal  sanitation,  has  achieved  imposing  statistics  in  the 
national  context.  It  universalized  services  for  treated  and  hydrometered  water 
supply, wastewater treatment, and waste collection, with a high level of selective 
collection—and maintains a sanitary landfill of recognized quality. It was the first 
municipal public sanitation entity in Brazil to gain ISO 9001:2000 certification. 
It’s  inclusive  view  of  sanitation  led  DAEP  to  take  charge  of  environmental 
education  for  the  municipality  in  1993,  creating  the  Center  for  Environmental 
Education  [Centro  de  Educação  Ambiental  –  CEA].    It  has  also  carried  out 
initiatives for cleaning household water storage tanks and for vector control.  
Its  administrative  process  includes  public  participation  via  a  review  board 
including  representatives  of  civil  society,  which  has  ensured  continuity  and 
sustainability  for  its  policies.  Members  of  the  Board  are  elected  in  bi-annual 
Forums  for  Sanitation  and  the  Environment.  Additionally,  the  municipality  has 
created  the  Ribeirao  Lajeado  Consortium,  in  order  to  protect  the  only  water 
source  supplying  the  city,  demonstrating  a  concern  to  make  its  activities 
consistent with its vision for water resource management.  
 
o  Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul (1,400,000 residents) 
 
Porto Alegre, capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, is a beacon for municipal 
delivery  of  sanitation  services,  for  at  least  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it  is  the  only 
Brazilian capital that did not lease its services to a state company, despite the 
implementation  of  PLANASA.  Second,  the  city’s  pioneering  introduction  of    
participatory  budgets  is  acknowledged  worldwide.  Inspired  by  the  experiment, 
various cities across the world have adopted the practice. 
DMAE  –  The  Municipal  Office  of  Water  and  Sewers  [Municipal  de  Água  e 
Esgotos],  is  the  largest  municipal  provider  of  sanitation  services  in  Brazil. 
Historically it has been committed to universal services, to serving its neediest 
population, and to democratic, participatory process.  According to Maltz (2005),  
DMAE changed after it implemented a participatory budget. Its concept of how to 
serve the needs of a population was transformed, with the result that workers 
and all management levels of the department began to re-focus their activities 
towards prioritizing users’ needs and public preferences and responding to their 
demands.  Adopting  the  participatory  budget  process  transformed  the  entity’s 
financial  management  as  well;  the  allocation  of  where  resources  should  be 
applied is now based on public forums, bringing the DMAE closer to society and 
formalizing public oversight of its activities.   
This strategy has yielded high levels of service to the city from water supply and 
sanitation providers. However, the model’s degree of sustainability will need to 
be assesssed in the future; the city’s governing political party changed in 2004, 
bringing change to management methods as well. The practice of participatory 
budgeting, for example, has been discontinued. 
 
 
o  Santo André, São Paulo (700,000 residents) 
 
The San André Municipal Agency [Serviço Municipal de Santo André—SEMASA] 
possesses emblematic status among Brazilian municipal agencies, to such an 
extent that ASSEMAE terms it the “showcase for sanitation”. The entity has a 
solid tradition of social oversight and of practicing what is termed integralidade 
[inclusivity]. In 1999 it took over municipal authority for water supply, sanitation, 
disposal of solid wastes and urban drainage and, subsequently, civil defense and 
environmental  management,  as  well.  This  group  of  agencies,  with  compatible 
goals  relating  to  environmental  health  and  protection,  generates  economic 
advantages  through  an  system  of  internal  cross-subsidies  and  the  extensive 
coordination of operations. 
SEMASA’s  activities have allowed the city to post high service indices—with a 
program  to  fight  leaks,  the  use  of  a  modern  system  of  automation,  selective 
waste collection throughout its territory, permanent waste disposal of recognized 
quality,  and  an  institution-wide  committment  to  users,  as  well  as  ISO  9001 
certification—through  a process of monitoring strategic indicators. The Executive 
Plan for Urban Drainage that the municipality developed in 1998 is considered    
the first initiative of its kind in the nation and has led to a reduction in flooding and 
inundation points. 
 
Yet  the  city  is  also  emblematic  in  the  political  conflict  between  its  state  and 
municipal sectors over water and sanitation services. Santo Andre is located in 
the  Metropolitan  Region  of  Sao  Paulo,  which  has  complete  systems  for 
producing  and  transporting  water,  and  for  the  transport  and  disposal  of 
wastewater, operated by the country’s largest state company, SABESP. The city 
receives  treated  water  from  SABESP  into  its  main  reservoirs,  and  has  its 
wastewater received and (a portion) treated by the state company after collection 
in SEMASA’S system. But the relationship between the two govermental levels 
has been a relatively combative one. Thirty-five years after SEMASA’s creation 
there is still no contract formalizing the relationship. There is not even an oficially 
established tariff for the services. 
It is evident that the experiments described above point to the possibility that 
local  efforts,  when  they  are  undertaken  with  seriousness,  administrative  and 
technical competence, and committment to the population served, can result in 
systems that are very efficient and effective. It bears re-stating that in the cases 
described this achievement was almost always the product of locally provided 
technical  and  financial  resources,  with  little  support  from  state  and  federal 
government authorities. Obviously many improvements still need to be made in 
some  of  these  systems,  for  example  those  that  have  not  attained  universal 
service, or haven’t made advances in sanitation. It should also be recognized 
that there are many municipal water supply and sanitation systems in Brazil that 
are  far  from  classifiable  as  efficient  and  effective.  However,  the  experiments 
described  here  do  provide  clear  demonstrations  of  what  potential  the 
strengthening  of  local  authorities  has for  transforming  the  present  situation  of 





c)  State company experiments  
In contrast to the ASSEMAE initiative described in the previous section, there is 
no survey that uses the same methodology for selecting the best experiments 
among  the  country’s  state  companies.  There  are  competitions  open  to  the 
participation  of  interested  service  providers—not  exclusively  for  state 
companies—for the purpose of granting awards to the most successful systems.    
The most established among them is the previously mentioned National Award 
for Quality in Sanitation Services given by  ABES – the Brazilian Association for 
Sanitation  and  Environmental  Engineering  since  1997.  More  recently,  the 
Ministry of Planning, Administration, and the Budget, under the auspices of its 
Program for Quality in Public Service- PQSP and  its National Award for Public 
Administration, created the special “Sanitation” category.  
The National Award for Public Administration in the Sanitation category has been 
given out only once, in 2005. It adapts that instrument, used to evaluate public 
administration in an inclusive way, specifically for the area of sanitation. For its 
assessment the award considers seven sets of criteria, analyzed from qualitative 
and the quantitative points of view: leadership; strategies and plans; citizens and 
society; information and awareness; people; processes; and results. The winning 
candidate in 2005, the Metropolitan Superintendent’s Office for EMBASA – The 
Baiana Water & Sanitation Company, S.A. [Superintendência Metropolitana de 
Salvador da EMBASA - Empresa Baiana de Águas e Saneamento S.A] is a unit 
of  that  state  company,  charged  with  “planning,  coordinating,  executing,  and 
monitoring operations and commercial and administrative activities relating to the 
water supply and sanitation systems of Salvador and its metropolitan region”. 
This  unit  has  posted  the  following  indicators:  100%  conformity  with  water 
potability standards (since 2002); 99.7% water coverage (97.8% in 2000); 65% 
wastewater  collection  coverage  (38.2%  in  2000);  a  48.6%  ratio  between  the 
volume of treated wastewater and that of water consumed (37.9% in 2001); a 3% 
complaint  rate  due  to  water  shortage  (EMBASA,  2006).  The  figures  are  not 
striking when compared with those of other state or municipal agencies, but the 
candidate  profile  for  the  Metropolitan  Superintendent’s  Office  reveals  a 
consistent effort at improving performance, particularly in planning, as well as in 
monitoring indicators. 
 
The Brazilian Sanitation Association’s (ABES) PNQS awards, for their part, are 
also based on weighing indicators on the basis of the same seven groups of 
criteria,  comparing  them  with  reference  or  bechmark  indicators.  For  2005  the 
only experiment to win a level 2 award, the highest, was the Southern Business 
Unit  of  the  Sao  Paulo  State  Basic  Sanitation  Company  [Companhia  de 
Saneamento  Básico  do  Estado  de  São  Paulo-SABESP],  which  became 
regionalized  according  to  hydrographic  basins  in  1995,  and  the  units  given 
financial and operational autonomy. The Southern Business Unit is “responsible 
for planning, operations, and maintenance of the systems for water distribution 
and  wastewater  collection,  as  well  as  sales  and  marketing  of  services  in  the 
southern  region  of    Sao  Paulo’s  metropolitan  area”  (ABES,  2004).  The  unit 
provides  water  supply  service  for  3.4  million  people  (94.5%  coverage)  and 
wastewater collection to 2.4 million (67.3% coverage). It treates wastewater for 
11.8%  of  the  population  in  its  area  of  activity  (ABES,  2004).  The  positive 
indicators  posted  by  the  Business  Unit  are  very  likely  the  result  of  intensive 
investment  in  operational  planning,  using  an  expert  management  staff 
specialized in monitoring and operationalizing indicators.     
 
Along with this top level award, the 2005 PNQS also gave level 1 recognition to 
three  experiments  in  the  interior  of  the  state  of  Minas  Gerais  operated  by 
COPASA-MG, two in the interior of Rio Grande do Sul operated by CORSAN, 
one in the interior of Bahia, and one unit in Salvador operated by EMBASA. The 
2005  awards  added  one  more  category,  entitled  “Innovation  in  Sanitation 
Management”,  which  selects  experiments  such  as  rewards  for  performance, 
innovative  management  mechanisms,  performance  evaluations,  the  use  of 
geographical data systems, and the management of urban solid wastes. All these 
administrative systems and mechanisms are the responsibility of state sanitation 
companies, which make up most of the applicants for the award, and who use it 
as a benchmark for their administrative goals. 
These  awards  initiatives  for  quality-related  criteria  are  originally  based  on 
paradigms for entrepeneurial efficiency, emerging from theoretical perspectives 
that are different, but always heavily influenced by the “entrepeneurial efficiency” 
concept.  However  worthy  of  merit  the  programs  may  be  in  the  sense  of 
recognizing  positive  experiments,  and  particularly  for  encouraging  good 
practices, there has been a recognized need to build an intrinsic paradigm, more 
specifically appliable to organizations of a public character. It is  therefore viewed 
as important to re-conceive the principle of efficiency in light of the role a public 
institution plays, and of its relationship to citizens and to society. Moreover, there 
is an understanding that, in the process of rewarding the criteria presently used, 
it  might  be  healthy  to  include  a  practice  in  which  the  organization’s  mission 
begins with society and is translated back into the organization, instead of an 
endogenous  view—with  the  mission  defined  within  and  then  translated  out  to 
society .  
 
When assessing state experiments, one aspect that still needs to be firmly taken 
into  consideration  is  the  state’s  relationship  with  what  should  be  its  principal 
interlocutor: the licensing authority, or, in the Brazilian model, the municipality 
that grants the concession. This remains a very sensitive relationship still, one 
prone to conflicts between interest groups, as has been demonstrated elsewhere 
in this text. Some initiatives with a more satisfactory relationship between the two 
entities  have  been  noted  in  Brazil,  especially  at  stages  when  concession 
contracts are being renewed.  
One of the documented experiments in this direction has been taking place in 
Recife, Pernambuco, where the election in 2000 of a mayor from the Workers 
Party  interrupted  an  effort  to  privatize  the  state  company,  the  Pernambucana 
Sanitation Company [Companhia Pernambucana de Saneamento—COMPESA]. 
Since 1971 it has been responsible for operating the sanitation and water supply 
systems for this city of 1.5 million residents. It would seem that the justification for 
privatization was that COMPESA was incapable of providing adequate services    
to  the  municipality,  which  posts  weak  indicators:  only  27%  of  the  population 
served  by  wastewater  collection,  less  than  10%  of  wastewater  being  treated, 
12% of the population having an irregular connection to the water supply system, 
and there is systematic water-rationing (Miranda, 2005). 
Recife’s  new  mayoral  administration,  with  the  support  of  a  broad  process  of 
discussion  with  the  public,  proposed  an  alternative  to  the  private  model: 
formalizing a service concession grant to this company (something never done 
up  to  that  point).  The  company  would  remain  public  and  subject  to  social 
oversight  as  well  as  supervision  by  the  authority  granting  the  concession.  A 
municipal    authority  would  be  created  for  planning,  for  supervising  the 
concession and for performing complementary services—particularly in favelas. 
However, while there was extensive social mobilization and, at least initially, a 
solidly  determined  mayoral  administration,  the  final  agreement  between  the 
municipality and the state has experienced repeated advances and reversals,  
making it difficult to introduce the model and test it. It is one more demonstration 
of  how  the  Brazilian  political  class  perceives  sanitation  administration  as  an 
important form of power. 
￿ ￿
a)  Condominial systems  
 
Condominial  solutions  adopted  in  Brazil  starting  in  the  1980’s—initially  for 
sanitation  and  in  a  second  stage  for  water  supply—have  been  the  object  of 
various studies and applications, not only in Brazil but in other parts of the world. 
In  1996  (Melo,  1996)  it  was  estimated  that  more  than  500,000  persons  in  a 
hundred Brazilian cities were being served by this solution for sanitation, with 
experiments  recorded  for  water  and  wastewater  systems  in  El  Alto,  Bolivia 
(Foster, no date) and for wastewater systems in Pakistan (Mara, 1998). It clearly 
is a solution with revolutionary potential for serving populations, both in terms of  
its physical design and its management model. 
From  a  physical  perspective,  the  system  recasts  the  traditional  concept  of  a 
service-receiving unit. While in the conventional system service is provided to 
each household unit, in the condominal concept it is provided to blocks or groups 
of  residences,  similar  to  the  model  of  vertical  condominums  or  apartment 
buildings. Consequently, the public system does not need to run  through each 
lots or yard, or be present in all streets. The result is a reduction of about 50% in 
the length of the wastewater system and 75% in the water system (Melo, 2005). 
The condominial system consists of a condominial branch, which is a network of 
simplified  wastewater  drains  located  inside  street  blocks  and  sidewalks  (see 
Figure 8) or a water supply system located in sidewalks, and the main street    
branch. Further, the system fosters the decentralizing of collection units, be they 
wastewater treatment stations or water reservoirs. 
Overall, a concept of this kind provides significant cost savings when compared 
with the conventional sanitation solution (Mara, 1998). 
 
 
Source: Melo (1996)        
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Figure 8. Siting options for condominial wastewater drainage branches 
 
In  terms of  its  administrative  process the model  provides for  the formation of 
users’  condominiums,  which  become  responsible  for    the  installation  and 
maintenance  of  the  condominial  branches  This  strategy  encourages  the 
community to organize around the issue of sanitaion and brings service providers 
closer to users. According to the model’s creator, “the condominium becomes not 
only  a  physical  unit  for  providing  services,  but  a  social  unit  for  facilitating 
collective  decisions  and  intitiatives  to  organize  the  community”.  The 
condominium  members  have  to  select  the  appropriate  plan  and  organize 
themselves to perform complementary activities such as sanitation education and 
direct participation in construction and maintenance. 
 
Yet  it  is  precisely  this  last  feature,  community  involvement,  that  can  be  the 
“achilles heel” of the process; if it is insufficient, and the continuity of the user’s 
organization is therefore not assured, the system may be less sustainable.  
    
Nevertheless the majority of reported experiments have demonstrated that the 
solution  is  broadly  successful,  judging  by  significant  cost  reductions  achieved 
and  by  genuine  community  engagement.  Experiments  as  diverse  as  those  in 
Brasília, the capital of the Federal district, Salvador, capital of the state of Bahia, 
and Parauapebas, in the state of Pará, as recorded and published by the World 
Bank (Melo, 2005), illustrate this assertion: 
 
·  In Brasília, the intervention involved scaling-up wastewater drain services 
by about 500,000 people at reduced cost, including areas ranging from 
those  of  a  very  low  socio-economic  level  to  those  with  high  incomes. 
Subsequent assessments showed that the level of maintenance required 
by the condominial system was no greater than that of the conventional 
system.  An  important  explanation  for  the  program’s  success  lay  in  the 
strong institutional support provided by the state company in authority, the 
Brasília Water and Drainage Company [Companhia de Água e Esgotos de 
Brasília-CAESB].  
·  In Salvador an extensive intervention to introduce condominial wastewater 
drains  reached  over  a  million  people  in  low-income  areas,  with  a  very 
uneven  pattern  of  settlement  and  very  unfavorable  topographical 
conditions. Moreover, and different from Brasilía’s case, the experiment 
was characterized by a certain inconsistency on the part of the entity in 
charge, the Baiana Sanitation Company – EMBASA [Empresa Baiana de 
Saneamento]. The model was not effectively institutionalized, and there 
was  a  low  level  of  community  involvement.  These  factors  were 
accompanied by other intrinsically unfavorable local conditions; most of 
the population already possessed intra-domicile facilities connected to the 
rainwater  collection  network,  without  having  to  pay  monthly  tariffs. 
Problems were therefore observed, such as low payment of maintenance 
tariffs and a low proportion of domiciles connected (around 30% in 2005). 
This is probably not an issue specific to the condominial model, but one 
that  could  occur  in  any  solution  for  expanding  wastewater  drainage 
service.  
 
·  The  Paraupebas  experiment  involved  converting  a  water  system  to  a 
condominial  system.  For  this  reason  it  is  innovative,  suggesting  the 
potential of adopting the condominial system, as well as the challenge of 
urban  water  supply.  The  city,  small  but  growing  at  an  increasingly  fast 
rate,  mobilized  large-scale  community  participation  during  the  system’s 
construction, and has brought about an expansion in water supply system 
coverage  for  less  than  30  %  of  the  projected  cost  of  the  conventional 
system.  
      
Conceptually the model has the potential for scale-up, keeping in mind, however, 
basic  conditions  for  guaranteeing  its  sustainability:  the  support  of  public 
authorities, financing for the system’s execution, and the adoption of  measures 
for sustaining community mobilization. The absence of these ingredients could, in 
the long run, jeopardize the continuity of systems of this type. 
 
5. Scenarios and perspectives for a new politico-institutional framework 
   
    5.1. Institutional organization 
 
Beginning with excutive branch organization of this field: after taking power in 
2003  the Lula government created the Ministry of Cities. Within that structure is 
the  National  Department  of  Environmental  Sanitation  [Secretaria  Nacional  de 
Saneamento Ambiental], whose website states its mission to be “ensuring the 
fundamental human rights of access to potable water and to life in a wholesome 
environment in the cities and countryside, through universal water supply and 
sanitation, the collection and treatment of solid wastes, urban drainage and the 
control of vectors and reservoirs of transmittable diseases”. The department soon 
began to oversee other activies such as financing, assessment, implementation, 
and  establishing  administrative  offices  for  sanitation,  making  it  the  hub  for 
sanitation services at the federal level. Three other departments associated with 
sanitation became part of the same ministry: Housing; Transportation and Urban 
Mobility;  and  Urban  Programs  [Habitação;  Transportes  e  Mobilidade  Urbana; 
Programas Urbanos].  
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In addition to this structure within the federal government, the Council of Cities 
[Conselho das Cidades] was created as a consultative and decision-making body 
with  the  purpose  of  “proposing  goals  for  the  formulation  and  implemention  of 
national  urban  development  policy,  as  well  as  monitoring  and  assessing  its 
execution”  (Brasil,  2005).  Its  structure  includes  the  Consulting  Committee  for 
Environmental Sanitation [Comitê Técnico de Saneamento Ambiental], which has 
an advisory function. It is intended that the same structure be reproduced at the 
state and municipal levels. 
 
Sanitation policy is influenced by the deliberations  of the Conferences of Cities, 
the  first  of  which  took  place  in  October,  2003  and  the  second  in  November-   
December/2005.  The  conferences  attracted  a  broad  spectrum  of  participants 
representing the various areas of urban policy. It passed resolutions on universal 
access and in favor of a greater committment to society, particularly the most 
disadvantaged, in sanitation policy. 
 
Initiatives are taking place in other ministries apart from those the Ministry of 
Cities is formulating. Among them may be mentioned: programs of the National 
Water  Agency  [Agência  Nacional  de  Águas  –  ANA  ]  in  support  of  basin 
committees and for supervising water usage, as well as for water conservation, 
the  planning  of  water  resources,  and  economic  incentives  to  introduce 
wastewater treatment units (Brasil, 2006). The Ministry of the Environment itself, 
with  its  mandate  to  implement  Agenda  21  for  Brazil  and  its  localities,  has  a 
number of points of interface between sanitation and water resources issues. 
 
On  the  state  level,  it  is  more  often  the  case  that  formal  entities  within  the 
executive branch that are dedicated to the area of water supply and sanitation do 
not exist. The function is in general limited to state companies. This model limits 
efforts in a given state to establish more universal and egalitarian service for its 
population, as already discussed, because the companies do not operate in all 
cities of a state. 
    
On  the  municipal  level,  while  the  federal  constitution  establishes  the 
municipality’s authority over organizing and delivering services defined as local in 
nature,  this  right—this  duty—is  not  always  fully  exercised.  According  to  the 
prevailing model the municipalities must either directly operate water supply and 
sanitation services, or lease these services to third parties—but in the latter case 
it is hoped the municipal government will monitor the lease and require that the 
concessionaire provide service compatible with the population’s interests. In the 
reality of Brazil today, municipal authorities are not always fully aware of that 
responsibility, and instead yield way to the concessionaire. 
 
Still,  in  any  analysis  it  is  clear  that  the  field  of  sanitation  in  Brazil  has  only 
haltingly  evolved  in  a  direction  more  consistent  with  the  nation’s  democratic 
reality—particularly when compared with other areas of the public sector—since 
re-democratization in the mid-1980’s. Social oversight and popular participation 
attained legitimacy with far greater speed and efficiency  in the areas of health, 
the environment, urban policy, and water resources. In the same way, owing to 
recognition and stimulus to action at the municipal level, decentralization took 
place in the areas of health—with the municipal councils—and the environment. 
The field of water resources itself, when it adopted hydrographic basins as a 
planning unit and established the basin committees to administer them, showed 
unmistakeable  evidence  of  burgeoning  local  authority.  A  deficit  of 
democratization therefore still exists in the area of sanitation, perhaps explained 
by the resistance of interest groups within the system to subjecting their power to 
oversight and control. 
    
In  terms  of  financing,  the  level  of  resources  made    available  by  the  federal 
government  for  sanitation  activities  has  rebounded  after  a  phase  of  tight 
restrictions in the last years of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government. Still, 
it must be recognized that there needs to be some regularity to this flow if the 
introduction and renovation of systems, as well as their maintenance, are to be  
sustainable. Moreover, it is both necessary and urgent that financial resources be 
utilized in a responsible and ethical way, with appropriate projects, i.e;  executing 
construction projects with the best engineering techniques, with budgets that are 
based  on  the  real  costs  of  services,  and  vigorous  oversight  of  any  form  of 
corruption  at  the  various  stages  of  the  process.  Furthermore,  the  task  of 
introducing a genuine system for supervising and assessing projects goes hand-
in-hand with generating sufficient funds  for the sector. 
 
The funds needed to universalize services up to the year 2020 are estimated by 
SNASA at R$ 184 billion (8); 169.2 billion for water supply and sanitation in urban 
areas; 9.2 billion for the same services in rural areas, and 5.6 billion for solid 
urban waste disposal. The figures seem high, but are in fact perfectly attainable if 
governments  recognize  the  importance  of  these  activities  and  prioritize  them, 
given  that  the  cost  estimate  for  reaching  those  goals  represents  an  annual 
investment of no more than 0.5% of GDP (Brasil, 2003). 
 
Another aspect of this analysis concerns attempts to private services, especially 
via  the  model  of  concession  contracts  to  private  companies.  This  effort  was 
associated with appeals and presssure on the part of multi-national agencies in 
favor of adopting a neoliberal macro-economic model for the country. Yet, the  
expansion of this model was less widespread than that seen in other countries. 
The explanation for this development cannot be traced to a single cause, but 
finds firmer ground when the  combination and interaction of a group of factors is 
analyzed (Castro and Heller, 2006). On the one hand, the paralyzed and still pre-
neoliberal  atmosphere  of  Sarney’s  government,  followed  by  the  political 
disorganization of Collor’s and the nationalist vision of Itamar’s, had the result 
that further efforts to implant the neoliberal model in Brazil only began, in their 
most  resolute  form,  under  the  government  of  Fernando  Henrique  Cardoso  in 
1995.  By  that  time  the  greatest  wave  of  enthusiasm  on  the  part  of  private, 
multinational water-supply and sanitation companies had already passed, mainly 
due to political-economic instability in countries where they had been active, such 
as Argentina. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  government  initiatives  to  scale-up  private  concession 
contracts  were  slowed  by  the  combined  resistance  of  the  most  influential 
governors  and  the  directors  of  important  state  companies,  who  refused  to 
surrender the political and economic capital they represented; the technocratic 
workforce of these companies and its labor organization, which feared the loss of 
privileges; and organizations representing municipal services, who had always 
advocated  that  the  services  should  be public.  An additional factor  which  may 
have  caused  concern  for  investors  was  the  absence  of  regulation  that  would    
more  clearly  define  the  legal  staus  of  private  concessions.  Particularly  in  the  
metropolitan  regions,  there  persists  to  this  day  a  vagueness  as  to  ownership 
rights  to  the  services  and  whether  they  are  retained  by  the  states  or  the 
municipalities. 
 
It should be noted, however, that these factors did not prevent some concession 
contracts from being concluded—for example in Manaus, capital of the state of 
Amazonas,  in  2000  (15).  Nevertheless,  in  2006  the  number  of  Brazilian 
municipalities with private concessions for water supply and sanitation services is 





Up  to  the  present  moment  there  has  not,  in  Brazil,  been  the  will  to  create  a 
national regulatory agency for the field of sanitation. The national agency closest 
to the sector is ANA  - the National Water Agency, linked with the Ministry of the 
Environment, whose mandate it is to implement the National Policy for Water 
Resources (Brasil, 2000) which regulates  the use of river and lake water under 
the  union’s  authority,  and  the  National  System  for  Management  of  Water 
Resources  [Sistema  Nacional  de  Gerenciamento  de  Recursos  Hídricos], 
“guaranteeing the sustainable use (of water), avoiding pollution and waste and 
ensuring for the country’s development water of good quality and in sufficient 
quantity for current and future generations” (Brasil, 2006). Which is to say that, 
no matter  what  its  interfaces may  be,  this is  an  agency  oriented  towards  the 
management of water resources. Its mandate does not envision regulating the 
delivery of water supply or sanitation services.  
 
At the federal level, there are mechanisms for social oversight in the area of 
water  supply  and  sanitation  via  the  national  councils  and  their  organizational 
structures  such  as  the  Council  of  Cities  and  its  Consulting  Committee  for 
Environmental  Sanitation;  the  National  Council  of  Health  and  its  Inter-sector 
Commission on Sanitation and the Environment; and the National Council on the 
Environment  –  CONAMA,  with  its  units  of  consultants  [for]  Environmental 
Oversight  and  Quality,  Environmental  Education,  and  Health,  Environmental 
Sanitation, and Waste Management. 
 
At the state and municpal levels there is no uniform model for regulation and 
social oversight. Several regulatory agencies have been created over the past 
ten  years,  grouped  under  ABAR  –  The  Brazilian  Association  of  Regulatory 
Agencies [Associação Brasileira de Agências de Regulação], but with models 
that vary greatly in their standards. 
 
At least 11 states can be identified as having organized agencies with mandates 
that include water supply and, or, sanitation services: one specifically for water-
related  issues:  water,  irrigation  and  sanitation  (Paraíba),  some  acting  through     
wide-ranging public agencies (Acre, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goiás and Alagoas), 
others through public services that are delegated or leased (Mato Grosso, Rio 
Grande do Sul, Ceara, Pernambuco, Amazonas and Rio de Janeiro). A greater 
concentration of these agencies may be found in states in the North, Northeast, 
and Central West. At the municipal level there are few agencies specifically for 
the sector. Some of them were created in order to regulate concession contracts 
(e.g.:  Cachoeiro  do  Itapemrim  –  Espírito  Santo),  others  to  monitor  the  public 
municipal service itself (e.g.: Joinville – Santa Catarina), and others to monitor a 
concession awarded a state company, such as Campo Grande (Mato Grosso do 
Sul) and Natal (Rio Grande do Norte). (16)   
 
One alternative model which some capitals, in a process of re-negotiating their 
relationship  with  state  concessionaires,  have  adopted,  is  creating  municipal 
sanitation  councils  made  up  of  members  from  government,  civil  society  and, 
eventually,  the  concessionaire.  An  example  of  this  experiment  is  unfolding  in 
Belo  Horizonte,  Minas  Gerais,  where  COMUSA  –  the  Municipal  Sanitation 
Council  [Conselho  Municipal  de  Saneamento]  was  created;  it  is  an  authority 
responsible  for  monitoring  relations  between  the  concessionaire  and  the 
municipality.  Among  the  roles  envisioned  in  its  bylaws  are:  (l)  regulating, 
supervising,  monitoring,  and  assessing  execution  of  the  municipal  sanitation 
policy; (ll) to monitor, set goals for, and make decisions regarding how  funds 
from  the  Municipal  Sanitation-FMS  fund  are  to  be  applied;  (lll)  approve  a 
Municipal  Sanitation  Plan  and  supervise  its  implementation;  (lV)  analyze  and 
provide an opinion as to the composition of tariffs or taxes levied on services; (V) 
approve  and  publish  a  report  “The  State  of  Environmental  Health  in  the 
Municipality  of  Belo  Horizonte”    ["Situação  de  Salubridade  Ambiental  do 
Município  de  Belo  Horizonte"]  (Belo  Horizonte,  2004).  Technical  and 
administrative  support  for  COMUSA  is  provided  by  an  arm  of  the  executive 
municipal authority, named the Sanitation Management Group [Grupo Gerencial 
de Saneamento-GGSAN]. Clearly, this council amounts to a form of regulation, 
with the participation of society, that is distinct from the model of a regulatory 
agency  independent  of  executive  authorities.  A  similar  model  is  due  to  be 
implemented in Recife, Pernambuco, as has already been described.  
 
     5.3 Legal mechanisms 
 
In  the  politico-insitutional  realm,  various  initiatives  were  undertaken  after 
PLANASA in order to establish a new legal and institutional basis for sanitation in 
the country, though these would not result in a new model that was both clearly 
defined and stable enough to resist changes by successive federal governments. 
 
As a result PLANASA’s basic outlines still prevail to this day: the state companies 
and their concession contracts, the principle of financial self-sustainability, timid 
social oversight, the selective, privileged financing of water supply and sanitation 
activities,  and  little  linkage  with  the  public  health,  water  resources,  urban 
planning, etc., sectors.  
    
At  the  beginning  of  the  21st  century  there  is  no  available  legislation,  on  the 
federal level, specifically for the organization of services—beyond very narrow 
references  in  the  federal  constitution  which  have    formed  the  basis  for 
distinguishing between the duties of municipalities and states, especially where 
ownership  rights  to  services  are  concerned.  The  biggest  debate  in  this  area, 
currently ongoing, is over ownership rights in metropolitan regions, since there 
are  few  doubts  as  to  the  role  of  the  municipality,  and  of  the  real  owner  of 
services, in other situations. Article 25, paragraph no. 3 of the federal constitution 
declares  that  “  the  states  may,  via  supplemental  laws,  establish  metropolitan 
regions,  urban  agglomerations,  and  micro-regions  composed  of  groups  of 
contiguous municipalities to coordinate the organization, planning and execution 
of  public    functions  [deemed]  in  the  common  interest”.  This  text  has  been 
interpreted by defenders of state-level involvment in metropolitan sanitation as 
delegating the power to act in these regions to that (state) level of the federation. 
Nevertheless, it appears clear that the spirit of the constitution gives the states 
the role of coordinating the organization, planning, and execution of services—
not that of directly organizing, planning, and executing them.   
 
Other pieces of legislation have—precariously—supplemented the sector’s legal 
underpinnings.  For  example,  the  law  on  public  consortia  -  Law  no.  11.107  of 
06/04/2005, which sets the ground rules for the formation of consortia among 
municipalities, between municipalities and states, or even involving the union, for 
delivering  services—principally  for  systems  or  units  of  systems  that  extend 
beyond the territorial lines of one municipality. 
 
However, at the start of 2005 the federal government sent a bill to congress that 
was  to  become  law    5.296,  which  aimed  to  establish  “goals  for  basic  public 
sanitation and for the National Environmental Sanitation Policy – PNASA”. This 
initiative is very important  because it might cover a historic gap in the sector, 
making possible the creation of clear guidelines for the delivery of [sanitation] 
services that would help foster universalization and  improvements in the quality 
of service delivered to the population (see box). 
 
In  addition  to  legislation  specifically  for  sanitation  such  as  that  described,  it 
should  be  pointed  out  that  legal  standards  associated  with  policies  for  other 
sectors could influence the orientation and practice of sanitation in the country. In 
addition to legislation in the field of water resources,  legal mechanisms in the 
areas of the environment, health, urban policy, housing, and agricultural policy, 
among others, interface with the sanitation sector at many points. 
 
In addition to legal tools for sectors in the areas mentioned, it is worth noting 
other definitions of a more general nature which influence government structure. 
One of these tools, previously referred to in section 3.2, is Law 8.987/1995 – the 
Concessions Law . Its practical application in the area of sanitation could not only 
bring about changes in how state companies determine their activities in concert    
with  municipalities,  but  might  broaden  the  delivery  of  services  by  private 
enterprises as well.     
 
Another legal tool is that of public-private partnerships—the so-called PPP’s – 
defined in Law 11.079/2004 and considered by the current federal government to 
be an important option for attracting private capital for executing public works 
projects. It is now in a phase of defining the structure of the so-called “guarantee 
fund”, without which the projects will not be launched. The bill appears to impact 
most  on  the  area  of  transportation,  and  ultimately  may  not  be  an  important 
alternative for attracting new resources to finance the sanitation sector, given the 
weak  attractivenesss the  sector has  held for  private  enterprise. Some  locally-
limited experiments may eventually take place—but these will not result in a new 
model that alters the structure of prevailing financing mechanisms. 
 
Another piece of legislation which interfaces with these issues is the City Act, or 
Law  10.257/2001,  which  “sets  guidelines,  for  the  public  sphere  and  in  the 
interests of society, regulating the use of urban property to promote the common 
good  and  the  safety  and  well-being  of  citizens,  as  well  as  environmental 
balance”” The legislation acknowledges the principle of  “the guaranteed right to 
sustainable  cities,  meaning  the  right  to  urban  property,  to  a  residence,  to 
environmental sanitation, to urban infrastructure, to transportation and to public 








Bill to organize public sanitation services, submitted by the federal 
government. 
 
From  the  beginning  of  its  term  in  January,  2003  the  current  federal 
administration,  via  its  National  Department  of  Environmmental  Sanitation,  has 
been working on a text for legislation that attempts to organize the sector—a 
clear need in the eyes of the group of actors who are its participants: operators, 
regulatory and oversight entities, user representatives, professionals, academics, 
etc.  After  various  versions  which  were  the  product  of  contributions  from  the 
sector’s branches and their actors, the bill was sent to the Chamber of Deputies 
for vote on an urgent basis, and was designated Bill n. 5.296. 
 
The purpose outlined for the bill is to establish “goals for basic public sanitation 
services and the National Environmental Sanitation Policy – PNSA”. The initiative 
has the potential to bring about positive change in the sector, accelerating the 
universalization  of  services  and  improvements  in  quality  of  service  to  the 
population.  Firstly,  a  new  institutional  order  promoted  by  these  goals  could    
provide  benchmarks  for  the  sector’s  regulation,  which  have  been  vague  for 
almost  two  decades  since  the  shelving  of  PLANASA.  During  that  period,  an 
atmosphere  without  clear  guidelines  left  actors  within  the  sector  insecure 
regarding the future. This absence of clarity has particularly affected relations 
between  municipalities  and  state  companies—especially  when  concession 
contracts cease to be in effect—but also makes it difficult for state companies to 
plan effectively over longer periods, and for some municipalities to plan beyond 
the  term  of  a  municipal  administration,  as  well.  Particular  tension  exists  in 
metropolitan areas, where a definitive interpretation of the constitution remains 
pending  with  respect  to  ownership  rights  to  services,  namely  in  cases  where 
water supply and sanitation systems can be classified as in the common interest, 
and not as a local interest. 
 
Among  other  aspects  of  bill  5.296,  special  attention  should  be  drawn  to:  its 
democratizing nature, the affirmation of the role of public authorities in the field of 
sanitation, a broad, inclusive view of the concept of sanitation, and a sytematic 
administrative orientation, including stages in the planning and assessment of 
services. Among the principles contemplated in the draft which attempt to body 
forth long-championed goals of the sanitation’s democratizing wing, are: 
 
- A broad concept of sanitation (defined in the draft as basic sanitation), including 
water  supply  and  sanitation  activities,  disposal  of  solid  urban  wastes,  and 
rainwater drainage; 
 
- Affirming that the services hold their objective to be a healthy environment, as 
opposed to viewing sanitation as an economic good; 
 
- Affirming the role of the government and the public significance of sanitation, as 
opposed to the concept of privatization as a means of universalizing service; 
 
- A committment to universal service, inclusion, and equity; 
 
- Affirming the concepts of regulation, planning, and assessment of services as 
interrelated. 
   
- Setting clear guidelines for delegating services, affirming the rights of a public 
authority granting a concession; 
 
- Affirming the centrality of the municipality’s role, reinforcing local authority;  
 
- Supporting social oversight and supplying concrete mechanisms for its 
implementation;  
 
- Encouraging low-income populations’ access to services; 
 
- Recognizing the need for a science and technology policy specific to the field 
    
The bill is based on the law for public consortia (Law no. 11.107 of 06/04/2005), 
and  aims  to  modify  the  behavior  of  state  companies  in  the  municipalities, 
providing  clearer  guidelines  and  recognizing  the  rights  of  the  public  authority 
granting a concession without, however, leading to a need for tender offers for 
concession contracts, which could lead to competition with private providers of 
services,  as  well  as  possibly  jeapordizing  certain  processes  of  concession 
renewal. 
 
The  bill  cleared  its  first  hurdle  of  assessment  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in 
December, 2005, after reconciliation with four other bills on the same subject 
which were then under consideration, and incorporating 862 amendments. 
 
Among  the  bills  under  consideration  was  a  bill  parallel  with  that  of  the 
government’s(17) – PLS 155/2005 – but conceived in a very different way that 
revealed the sector’s conflicting interest groups. It was a bill that reduced the 
understanding  of  sanitation  simply  to  water  supply  and  sanitation  services, 
echoing, on this point, a frequently-denounced distortion at the time PLANASA  
was formulated. In addition, it is quite apparent that the bill attempts to transfer to 
the  state  level—and  therefore  subtract  from  the  municipal  level  –  the 
responsibility for delivery of services in many situations, while applying its own 
perspective on the concepts of services of local interest as opposed to services 
in the common interest, [thus] reinterpreting the federal  constitution. 
 
It should be acknowledged that, in his/her report, the bill’s assessor appears to 
take  care  to  incorporate  some  key  points  from  bill  155.  In  connection  with 
ownership rights to services in metropolitan areas, the assessor’s bill proposed 
the  following  alteration:  “public  services  for  basic  sanitation  in  the  common 
interest  shall  have  their  planning,  organization,  regulation,  delivery,and 
supervision unified under the responsibility of the respective state, including the 
coordination of its activities and components, under the terms of state law”. Such 
an interpretation clearly sides with the interests of state governments and state 
sanitation  companies  against  the  interests  of  municipal  representatives. 
ASSEMAE  –  the  National  Association  of  Municipal  Sanitation  Services,  has 
registered its disagreement with such a formulation, arguing that “the question of 
ownership  is  a  constitutional  matter  and  may  not  be  resolved  by  means  of 
ordinary legislation” (ASSAMAE, 2006). 
 
At the moment the future of this effort at defining a legal framework for sanitation 
in Brazil is not easy to predict(beginning of 2006). There is a visible polarization 
of  interests  within  the  sector,  pitting  state  governments  and  state  sanitation 
companies—with  significant power to place pressure on parliament—against the 
federal government, municipal authorities, and a significant portion of organized 
civil  society  with  ties  to  the  sector  (urban  residents’    movements,  consumer 
defense groups, professional entities, etc.) This atmosphere greatly complicates 
the  forming  of  a  consensus  around  crucial  points.  Both  the  struggle  among    
interest  groups,  and  the  important  niche  of  power  the  sanitation  sector 
repreresents, are neatly exposed here. 
 
Added  to  this  conflict  is  the  weakness  of  the  federal  government--which  is 
returning with a serious political crisis on its hands and a troubled relationship 
with Congress--and the fact that 2006 is a year of widespread elections in the 
country  (executive,    federal  and  state  legislative),  elections  which  traditionally 
paralyze legislative work and introduce different  variables of an electoral and 
clientalist nature into the decision-making process. 
 
In view of these facts—and noting, as well, that the draft requires the approval of 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate in a long process involving 
committees and plenary votes—it apears unlikely that any bill of this nature will 
be  approved  during  this  present  term  of  President  Lula’s.  The  bill’s  assessor 
himself,  deputy  Julio  Lopes,  offered  the  opinion  that  the  chances  of  the  final 
text’s being approved in 2006 were not great (Chamber [Press] Agency, 2006). 
 
In the event the bill is not approved in 2006, various other factors will influence 
the prospects of clear guidelines for organizing the sector, one of them being the 
results  of  the  elections  for  the  presidency  of  the  republic  themselves.  The 
deregulation that would result from one more long period without such guidelines 
could  have  a  very  negative  impact  on  the  effort  to  create  a  more  favorable 
atmosphere for universalizing sanitation services, and for reaching the country’s 
Millenium  Development  Goals,  thereby  ensuring  quality  in  the  delivery  of 
services, respect for the user, environmental protection, and genuine advances 





The descriptions and analyses in this document of the historical course, current 
scene,  important  experiments,  and  future  scenarios  for  water  supply  and 
sanitation in Brazil may lead to a few  conclusions, however tentative: 
·  Historical analysis suggests that there has been a gradual change in how 
the national goverbnment has viewed this field, as public policy and the 
degree  of  responsibility  it  has  assumed  for  it.  This  changing  view  has 
resulted  from  factors  such  as  the  focus  on  disease  control,  economic, 
political, social, and cultural processes, and the prevailing definition of the 
nation-state in each era. On the other hand, the nature of the sector itself 
has  influenced  the  dynamic  of  other  sectors  and  other  aspects  of  the    
population’s  quality  of  life—for  example,  its  impacts  on  health,  the 
environment, and social and economic conditions.    
·  Present  assymetries  in  service  provision  contain  a  strong  social 
component : the excluded predominantly have less income, live in smaller 
municipalities, and have a lower HDI.   
·  The model foreseen in PLANASA, that of state company administration: 
favored  water  supply  to  the  detriment  of  sanitation;  did  not  succeed  in 
expanding, as intended, to municipalities in the least developed regions; 
did  not  expand  water  supply  greatly  to  municipalities  with  the  highest 
HDI’s;  and  gave  less  priority  in  sanitation  to  municipalities  with  under 
20,000  residents.  Ultimately,  the  entrepeneurial  design  of  the  plan  has 
contributed to enlarging assymetries. 
·  The  use  of  available  quantitative  indicators  often  masks  the  state  of 
access to services; it should be constrained by methodological safeguards 
if  it  is  to  offer  satisfactory  descriptions,  preferably  combining  different 
“lenses” such as quantitative and qualitative assessments, aggregate and 
disaggregated  data,  secondary  data  with  field  research,  historical 
perspective  with  the  current,  or  cyclical  context,  or  politico-institutional 
analysis  with  the  assessment  of  indicators.  Such  caution  is  important 
when the same reality is temporally compared using surveys based on 
different methodologies. It becomes even more so when different realities 
are  compared,  above  all  countries  in  which,  apart  from  possible 
methodological  differences  in  surveys,  the  very  construction  of  the 
concept of access, and/ or its institutional conceptualization, may interfere  
·  It is not easy to forecast what future there may be for the attempt to define 
a  legal  basis  for  sanitation  in  Brazil.  There  is  a  visible  polarization  of 
interest groups, pitting governments and state sanitation companies, on 
the  hand,  against  the  federal  government,  municipal  authorities  and  a 
siginificant portion of civil society, on the other. This greatly impedes the 
forming  of  any  consensus  around  crucial  points.  The  situation  neatly 
exposes conflicts between interests groups and the niche of power the 
sanitation sector represents.  
·  History,  and  current  tensions  in  the  sector,  show  that  taking  charge  of 
water supply and sanitation services has been the object of interest group 
ambitions  because  it  is  seen  as  a  significant  lever  of  power—political, 
economic,  and  social.  As  a  result,  disputes  have  broken  out  between 
representatives of the public and private sectors and federal authorities.   
To conclude: we must emphasize the importance that efforts to shed light on the 
current status of water supply and sanitation in Brazil, and developing countries 
in general with similar constraints, have in helping to identify the best strategies 
for universalizing access. Suitable methodologies for this can be improved, using 
the combined pool of all research that aims at this assessment. 
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